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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5481
Despite the growing importance of commitments to 
foreign investors in services in regional trade agreements, 
there are no applied general equilibrium models in the 
literature that assess these regional impacts. This paper 
develops a 52 sector applied general equilibrium model 
of Tanzania with foreign direct investment, and uses 
that model to assess Tanzania’s regional and multilateral 
trade options. The model incorporates the features of 
the modern theory of international trade that has shown 
empirically that trade and foreign direct investment 
can increase productivity, and trade and foreign direct 
investment with technologically advanced countries 
is especially valuable for that purpose. To assess the 
This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to  assess the impacts of liberalization of barriers in services on growth and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at dtarr@worldbank.org. 
sensitivity of the results to parameter values, the model 
is executed 30,000 times, and the results are reported as 
confidence intervals of the sample distributions.
   The analysis finds that a 50 percent preferential 
reduction in the ad valorem equivalents of barriers 
in all business services by Tanzania with respect to its 
African regional partners would be slightly beneficial for 
Tanzania. But wider liberalization, with larger partners 
or multilaterally, it will yield much larger gains due to 
providing access to a much wider set of service providers.  
Finally, the results show that the largest gains in services 
would be derived from reduction of regulatory barriers 
that are geographically non-discriminatory. 
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Both economic theory and empirical literature have shown that wide availability of 
business services results in productivity gains to the manufacturing sector and contributes to its 
international competitiveness.
1  International commitments to national treatment and market 
access for foreign investors in key business services sectors may help developing countries 
obtain better access to these services that contribute to productivity gains.  Some developing 
countries, however, are hesitant to make substantial multilateral commitments, but may be more 
inclined to proceed in regional arrangements with other neighboring developing countries, rather 
                                                            
1 Arnold et al. (2007), Fernandes (2007) and Fernandes and Paunov (2008) have provided econometric estimates of 
the gains from services liberalization.  Marshall (1988) shows that in three regions in the United Kingdom 
(Birmingham, Leeds and Manchester) almost 80 percent of the services purchased by manufacturers were bought 
from suppliers within the same region.   He cites studies which show that firm performance is enhanced by the local 
availability of producer services. In developing countries, McKee (1988) argues that the local availability of 
producer services is very important for the development of leading industrial sectors. 
Both the urban economics literature (Vernon, 1960; Chinitz, 1961) and the modern economic geography literature 
(e.g., Krugman, 1991; Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999) have focused on the fact that related economic activity 
is economically concentrated due to agglomeration externalities (e.g., computer businesses in Silicon Valley, 
ceramic tiles in Sassuolo, Italy).  Evidence comes from a variety of sources.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that 
firms operating in economically dense areas are more productive than firms operating in relative isolation. Caballero 
and Lyons (1992) show that productivity increases in industries when output of its input supplying industries 
increases. Hummels (1995) shows that most of the richest countries in the world are clustered in relatively small 
regions of Europe, North America and East Asia, while the poor countries are spread around the rest of the world. 
He argues this is partly explained by transportation costs for inputs since it is more expensive to buy specialized 
inputs in countries that are far away for the countries where a large variety of such inputs are located. 3 
 
than with a major Northern partner. Commitments in services, however, are often limited in 
South-South arrangements.  
Since the early 1990s, regional trade agreements have surged; 283 are in force and have 
been notified to the WTO as of February 2010.
 2  Given the inclusion of services in modern FTA 
agreements negotiated with the EU, the US and in some other agreements, economists need to be 
able to assess the impact of services commitments as part of their advice to governments 
regarding preferential trade agreements.  Services commitments in regional agreements could 
lead to substantial productivity improvements. But is there an analogy to trade diversion in goods 
whereby preferential commitments in services could be immiserating?  Are developing countries 
likely to obtain substantially larger gains from an agreement with a developed country, rather 
than a developing country?  How do the gains of preferential versus global liberalization 
compare?  
Policy-makers have expressed considerable demand for analysis of their actual or 
potential regional agreements. Applied modelers have responded with applied general 
equilibrium models that focus on goods. So the literature now contains a substantial number of 
good studies (summarized below) that examine regional agreements in goods. But the literature 
does not contain any numerical studies of regional arrangements that involve commitments to 
multinational firms who will undertake foreign direct investment in services.  
Given substantial demand by governments for advice on their prospective trade policies 
in the regional and multilateral arenas, it is unfortunate that the profession does not have a 
framework for assessing the ex ante welfare impact of preferential reduction of barriers against 
foreign direct investment in business services. We attempt to fill that gap in this paper. Crucial to 
                                                            
2 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. This does not include a significant number that are in 
force but which have not been notified to the WTO.  4 
 
the analysis, we incorporate the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier mechanism of endogenous productivity 
gains from additional varieties of imperfectly produced goods and services. 
Tanzania is an example of a country facing most of these policy choices mentioned 
above. In many of its business services sectors (including maritime and road transportation, 
banking, insurance and professional services) the regulatory regime imposes significant burdens 
on the cost of providing services, both by Tanzanian service providers and by multinationals.  In 
2010 it is involved in negotiations of commitments in services in various regional arrangements, 
including the European Partnership Agreements, SADC
3 and the East African Customs Union.
4 
And in the context of its international negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda, 
Tanzania may be called upon to make further commitments in the business services area. 
Tanzania is proceding cautiously regarding services commitments in all these areas, but is taking 
steps to adopt a mutual recognition agreement in professional services within the East African 
Customs Union.  
In this paper we develop a 52-sector small open economy comparative static computable 
general equilibrium model of Tanzania that we believe is appropriate to evaluate the impact of 
Tanzanian liberalization of services barriers.  We build on the model of Jensen, Rutherford and 
Tarr (2008), but we decompose the rest of the world into three regions: the European Union; our 
Africa region; and the Rest of the World. All foreign regions are sources of foreign direct 
investment in some of the business services sectors. 
We find that a 50 percent preferential reduction in the ad valorem equivalents of barriers 
in all business services with respect to its African regional partners would be slightly beneficial 
                                                            
3SADC (Southern African Development Community) is comprised of Angola, Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,  Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
4 The East African Customs Union is a customs union among Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi.  5 
 
for Tanzania in our central elasticity case.  But if preferential liberalization with the Africa 
region is extended to an agreement with the EU, the gains would triple. If the liberalization of 
business services commitments is extended to all foreign partners (called “Unilateral” in the 
tables), the gains would increase by seventeen times.  Thus, these results suggest that preferential 
liberalization in the region is a valuable first step, but wider liberalization, with larger partners or 
multilaterally will yield much larger gains due to providing access to a much wider set of 
services providers.  
Finally, we estimate that a serious effort to reduce non-discriminatory regulatory barriers 
(that is, barriers that raise the costs of Tanzanians as well as foreign services providers in 
Tanzania) would roughly quadruple the benefits of multilateral liberalization in Tanzania.  
Multilateral liberalization yields larger gains than preferential liberalization since with 
preferential liberalization Tanzania will not obtain additional service sector suppliers from 
excluded countries, and, in fact, will suffer losses of service sector suppliers in excluded 
countries. Moreover, we summarize research below that shows that small countries gain more 
technological spillovers from trade with technologically advanced countries (at least in research 
and development intensive products).  Our model allows for differentiated rates of technological 
spillover by region and product, and this is the main explanation for why the estimated gains 
from a preferential agreement with the EU will yield larger gains for Tanzania than a preferential 
agreement with the African region.  
Combining African regional liberalization with regional liberalization with the EU would 
capture the gains from agreements with both regions. Tanzania could combine an agreement with 6 
 
the EU and the Africa region with liberal rules of origin, and the results would then come closer 
to the gains from unilateral liberalization with the whole world.  
We devote considerable attention to the sensitivity of our results to uncertainty in the 
parameters. First, to understand the model better, we conduct piecemeal sensitivity of the results, 
where we isolate the impact of each of the parameters to ascertain which parameters most 
strongly impact the results. Second, to assess the robustness of the results to parameter 
uncertainty, we conduct systematic sensitivity analysis, where we execute the model 30,000 
times. Each simulation is based on a random draw of all the parameter values; we then present 
sample distributions and sample confidence intervals of the key variables.  Finally, we conduct 
sensitivity on a range of values of key parameters that determine the productivity impacts in 
imperfect competition. 
 
With the notable exception of Mattoo and Fink (2003) and Mattoo and Sauve (2008), 
there has been surprisingly little theoretical research on the welfare economics of services 
liberalization in preferential agreements, either in perfect or imperfect competition. When 
granting preferential market access to foreign investors in services, there is no tariff loss. Since it 
is the tariff loss that is the source of the possible welfare loss in goods, one might infer that 
preferential reduction of services barriers in unambiguously beneficial.  If domestic firms capture 
rents from the barriers, however, then these rents are analogous to tariff losses in goods.  We 
show graphically, in a perfectly competitive partial equilibrium model, that losses may occur 
from preferential liberalization of services with initial rent capture. With imperfect competition, 
preferential liberalization will lead to a gain of varieties from the partner countries, but a loss of 
varieties from excluded countries; the lost varieties can lead to a net loss of welfare. We show 
that, with initial rent capture, there is plausible range of elasticities where there is a loss of 7 
 
welfare due to the loss of varieties and show why agreements with large, technologically 
advanced partner countries are more likely to lead to gains.  
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in section II with a brief review of the 
applied general equilibrium literature of regional arrangements. In section III we discuss the 
welfare economics of preferential trade liberalization in services. In section IV, we provide an 
overview of the Tanzanian services sectors. We discuss how we estimated the tariff equivalents 
of the barriers in services in section V. We provide an overview of the model in section VI and a 
discussion of the data in section VII. The central results are presented in section VIII and 
sensitivity results are presented in section IX. Given the initiative of the East African Customs 
Union to begin to include services in their agreements by negotiating mutual recognition 
agreements in professional services, we focus on a range of possible policy options in 
professional services. These are presented in section X. Conclusions are presented in section XI. 
In appendix A, we discuss the trade and tariff data in some detail. We document the calculation 
of ownership shares by sector and region in appendix B. How we obtained estimates of the Dixit-
Stiglitz elasticities in goods is described in appendix C. Our estimation of the ad valorem 
equivalents of barriers in professional services in explained in appendix D and our calculations 
of the research and development intensity by sector are in appendix E.  
 
II. Review of the Applied General Equilibrium Literature on Regional Agreements 
The formation of the Canada-US free trade agreement led to the path-breaking work of 
Harris (1984) and of Cox and Harris (1986) in incorporating imperfect competition into a small 
open economy applied general equilibrium model. They showed that if the agreement leads to a 
more competitive pricing strategy by Canadian firms, there would be substantial welfare gains 8 
 
from rationalization. The creation of the single market in the European Union led to innovative 
analysis that required the use of multi-region models with imperfect competition or dynamic 
effects in order to capture the impacts of the key features of the single market (Harrison, 
Rutherford and Tarr, 1996; Smith and Venables, 1988; Baldwin, Forslid and Haarland, 2000). 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led to a large number of CGE studies 
summarized in the Francois and Shiells (1994) volume. Among these, Levy and van Wijnbergen 
(1995) use their dynamic CGE model to argue that dynamic incentive problems in adjustment 
policies for Mexican agriculture imply that adjustment policies should focus on increasing the 
value of the assets of poor farmers, not their incomes. Preferential arrangements of the European 
Union with its Mediterranean neighbors led to policy-maker requests for CGE analysis. `Using 
small open economy models of the developing country under perfect competition (Harrison, 
Rutherford and Tarr (1997a) for Turkey; Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1993) for Morocco; and 
Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1995) for Tunisia), these North-South arrangements were 
estimated to beneficial to the developing country due to the introduction of competition into the 
Southern markets.  Finally, Chile has adopted a strategy of negotiating preferential arrangements 
with all potential partners (called “additive regionalism” or “competitive regionalism”). This 
strategy has been controversial within Chile regarding preferential arrangements with its 
Southern neighbors. Using a multi-region perfect competition model, Harrison, Rutherford and 
Tarr (2002) estimated that Chile would lose from individual preferential arrangements with 
Southern neighbors unless it lowered its then 11 percent uniform tariff. But these authors show 
that the  agreements with Southern partners are beneficial to Chile in the context of Chile’s 
additive regionalism strategy due to substantial estimated terms of trade gains to Chile in partner 
markets and the reduction of trade diversion costs if the Northern partners are included in the 9 
 
network of agreements.5  Rutherford and Tarr (2003) showed that simply making the Chilean 
model fully dynamic will not increase the estimated gains from these agreements if there are no 
endogenous productivity effects. 
 
III. Welfare Economics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Services 
Although our model is a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition in all 
business services sectors, to provide intuition, with begin with a graphical description in partial 
equilibrium and perfect competition. We subsequently discuss how imperfect competition and 
general equilibrium affect the results. In our model there are four regions. In the case of the 
Tanzania model the regions are: Tanzania, the EU, Africa (SADC plus the EAC) and the Rest of 
the World. Although in our model we have firm level product differentiation, for simplicity, we 
begin the discussion by assuming product differentiation at the level of the country.  The demand 
curve for any region, takes the prices of services from the other three regions as shift parameters.  
Consider the case of preferential liberalization in services by Tanzania with respect to the 
European Union. For the purpose of the welfare economics, we may ignore the Tanzanian 
market for Tanzanian services since we assume no distortions in this market. Thus, we confine 








Welfare Economics in the Tanzanian Market of EU Services  
We begin, in figure 1, by examining the welfare impacts in the market for EU services in 
Tanzania. We consider two cases in figure 1: Case I, where EU supply is assumed to be infinitely 
elastic and Case II, where EU supply of services in Tanzania is less than perfectly elastic. We 
denote by P* the vector of prices of substitute services from Africa, ROW and Tanzania.  
The demand curve for EU services takes the vector of prices of substitutes from Africa, 
ROW and Tanzania as shift parameters; this vector is labeled P* in figure 1. The preferential 
reduction in barriers against EU firms lowers the cost of production of EU firms and shifts the 
supply curve down. The increase in supply from EU firms drives down the price of EU services 
and decreases the demand curves for substitute services from the ROW, Africa and Tanzania. 
The decline in demand for services from ROW, Africa and Tanzania results in a lower price for 
these services. There is then a feedback effect on EU services, resulting in a decline in demand 
for EU services.  In both cases I and II, the equilibrium before (after) preferential reduction of 
the barriers against the EU is labeled A (B).  
The case of perfectly elastic partner supply. Consider first Case I. The reduction in the 
price of EU services in Tanzania, leads to an increase in consumers surplus that is the sum of the 
rectangle EACF and a triangle ABC of efficiency gains. If Tanzanians initially captured the rents 
from the barriers, then the rectangle EACF equals the loss of Tanzanian rents. Then the welfare 
gains are limited to the efficiency triangle ABC. But if Tanzanians do not capture rents from 
barriers initially, the welfare gains are significantly larger and equal EABF, the sum of the 
rectangle and triangle. 
The case of less than perfectly elastic partner supply.  In Case II, we assume that EU 
services suppliers require higher prices to supply additional services. Then, the increase in the 11 
 
demand for EU services results in an increase in the price of EU services relative to Case I.6   
That is, there is a greater fall in the price of EU services in Case I than in Case II. There is an 
adverse terms of trade loss for Tanzania in Case II equal to FCDG, as EU producers will capture 
infra-marginal rents equal to the area FBDG.  
There is an increase in consumers’ surplus equal to the area EABF and a triangle of 
efficiency gains equal to ABC.7 Rents are still the key to the story. If rents are not captured 
initially, the welfare gain in the EU market is positive and equal to the consumer’s surplus 
change of EABF. If Tanzanians do capture rents initially, then the sign of the welfare change in 
the EU market is ambiguous. There is a triangle ABC of efficiency gains, but a rectangle of 
terms of trade loss equal to FCDG. The net welfare change is ABC – FCDG.  
 
Welfare Economics in the Tanzanian Market of African and Rest of World Services 
In figure 2, we depict the welfare impacts in the markets for African and Rest of the 
World services suppliers in Tanzania of preferential liberalization of barriers against EU services 
suppliers in Tanzania. We depict the cases where supply of services from the Rest of the World 
is perfectly elastic, but upward sloping from African suppliers. In the figures, P** is the vector of 
prices of substitutes for African services and  P*** is the vector of prices of substitutes for Rest 
of the World services in Tanzania. As a result of preferential liberalization with respect to the 
EU, the prices of substitutes decline in the new equilibria, and this shifts the demand curves in 
for Rest of World and African services in the new equilibria. 
                                                            
6 By construction, the height AD in Case II, is equal to the height AC in Case I. The price falls by the full length of 
AC in Case I; but since the EU is not infinitely large in Case II, the increase in demand for EU services drives up the 
price of EU services in Tanzania. Thus, the height of AC is Case II is less than the height of AC in Case I.     
7 We adopt the procedure of Burns (1974) and connect the equilibria with a straight line for the purpose of 
calculating the welfare change.  12 
 
  Market for rest of the world services in Tanzania. In the Rest of the World market, if 
Tanzania captures the rents initially from the services barriers, it would lose the rectangle of 
rents ABCD, and this would be the welfare change. If there is no rent capture initially, then there 
is no welfare impact in the Rest of the World market from preferential liberalization of barriers 
against the EU services suppliers.  
  Market for African services in Tanzania. The demand for African services declines due to 
the decline in the prices of substitutes for African services in Tanzania, so the equilibrium moves 
from point A to point B. Initially rents are equal to the area HACD. In the new equilibrium, rents 
are equal to GBFE. We decompose this initial rent area HACD into three areas: the sum of α + β 
+ δ , where α = HJBG, β = GBID and δ = JACI. We decompose the subsequent rent area GBFE 
into β + γ, where γ = DIFE. Rents in the new equilibrium minus rents initially are equal to  β + γ  
- (α + β + δ) = γ - α - δ.  For illustration, assume linear supply curves where the shift parameter 
induces a parallel shift in the supply curve.8 Then  α  = γ and the change in rents equals -δ. That 
is, the reduction in rents is equal to the rectangle δ.  If rents are captured initially, the loss of 
rents is a welfare loss to the home country. If there is no domestic rent capture initially, this area 
does not enter into the welfare calculation.  
  In addition, there is a terms of trade gain for the home country. That is, in the new 
equilibrium Tanzanians consume Q1 of African services at price P1AF. In the initial equilibrium 
it had been necessary for Tanzanians to pay PoAF. Thus, the area α = HJBG is a welfare gain to 
Tanzanians due to the lower prices they pay on African services. Thus, with no initial rent 
capture by Tanzanians, the net welfare change for Tanzanians in the Africa market is positive 
                                                            
8 More generally, the change in rents is equal to:     t [P1
AF Q1 – Po
AF Qo ] < 0. 13 
 
and equal to the terms of trade gain α.  If, however, there is initial rent capture by Tanzanians, 
the net welfare change in the Africa market is ambiguous and equal to α –δ.  
 
Elasticity Considerations—Why North-South Agreements Are More Likely to Yield Gains  
Market for partner country services.  We illustrate the impacts with the aid of Figure 
3. Case I is the market for the partner country. It builds on figure 1, case II, where we have 
drawn two sets of supply curves—a more elastic pair and less elastic pair. Both the less elastic 
(S0TI) and more elastic tax ridden supply curves (S0Te ) must pass through to point A; and to be 
consistent with the estimated ad valorem barrier, the undistorted less elastic (S1I) and undistorted 
more elastic supply curve (S1e) must both pass through the point D. After liberalization, with 
larger elasticities, the new equilibrium shifts to B’, and shifts to B with lower supply elasticities. 
With initial rent capture, the welfare change is equal to ABC- FCDG (less elastic case) or 
AB’C’- F’C’DG in the more elastic case. The difference in the welfare between the high elastic 
and low elasticity cases is [∆ e - ∆ I] = [AB’C’- F’C’DG] – [ABC- FCDG]  = [AB’C’ - ABC] 
+ [FCDG - F’C’DG]. Clearly, FCDG > F’C’DG and the second term is positive, but it would 
vanish in the welfare calculation with no initial rent capture.  Since the price falls to F’, the 
height of the triangle AB’C’ exceeds the height of triangle ABC. What is the impact of 
elasticities on the new equilibrium quantity?  With larger elasticities, the price of EU services 
falls more, inducing a larger increase in the quantity demanded of EU services. On the other 
hand, the larger fall in the price of EU services, induces a larger fall in the equilibrium price of 
competitor services and thus a larger shift down in the demand curve for EU services. Since the 
former is the first order effect and the latter a second order effect, we expect Q1e > Q1I and have 14 
 
drawn the figure accordingly. Then AB’C’ > ABC and [∆ e - ∆ I] > 0 . That is, we have 
greater welfare gains in the partner country market with larger supply elasticities in the partner 
country.  
Market for excluded country services.  We illustrate the impacts with the aid of figure 
3, right hand side. It builds on figure 2, right hand side, where we have drawn two sets of supply 
curves—a more elastic pair and less elastic pair. To be consistent with the initial equilibrium data 
point, both the less elastic (S0TI) and more elastic tax ridden supply curves (S0Te) must pass 
through to point A; and to be consistent with the estimated ad valorem barrier, the undistorted 
less elastic (S0I) and undistorted more elastic supply curve (S0e) must both pass through the 
point C. Preferential liberalization with another country results in a downward shift in demand 
for the excluded countries services. Equilibrium in the market for excluded country services 
shifts to to B’ with higher elasticities, and shifts to B with lower supply elasticities. What is the 
impact of elasticities on the new equilibrium price and quantity?  With a higher supply elasticity, 
in response to the initial shift down in demand, there is a smaller reduction in price and larger 
reduction in quantity. On the other hand, there is an offsetting second order effect. Since the 
price of excluded market services initially falls less with high elasticities, there is a smaller 
second order cross-elasticity effect on the reduction in demand, so the demand curve shifts in 
less in the high elasticity case. We assume the second order effect is smaller so that we have 
drawn G’ > G and Q1e  <  Q1I. 
With initial rent capture, the welfare change is equal to HJ’B’G’ – J’I’CA in the high 
elasticity case and equal to HJBG – JICA in the lesser elasticity case; the second terms vanish 
with no initial rent capture.   The difference in the welfare between the high elasticity and low 
elasticity cases is [∆We - ∆WI] = [HJ’B’G’ – J’I’CA] – [HJBG – JICA]  = [HJ’B’G’- HJBG] + 15 
 
[JICA - J’I’CA]. The first term is the difference in the terms of trade gains and is negative. The 
second term, is the lost rents and is also negative in the case of initial rent capture and is zero 
otherwise. Thus, the welfare losses in the excluded country markets are larger with higher 
elasticities of supply of the partner.  
Summary of Results in Partial Equilibrium with Perfect Competition 
  Welfare gains with no initial rent capture.  With no initial rent capture, there is an 
unambiguous welfare gain deriving from an increase in welfare in the EU and African markets 
and no welfare change in the Rest of the World market. In the market for EU services, the 
welfare gain is equal to the increase in consumer’s surplus, from a triangle ABC of efficiency 
gains and a rectangle EACF of gains in rents. In the market for African services, the welfare gain 
is equal to the area of terms of trade gain.   
  Ambiguous welfare impacts with initial rent capture. With initial capture of the rents by 
the home country, a significant potential for losses by the home country arises. In the market for 
EU services, there is no rectangle of rents that are gained and the gains from a triangle of 
efficiency gains will be reduced or exceeded by the terms of trade loss when the EU has an 
upward sloping supply curve. In the market for Rest of the World services, there is a rectangle of 
lost rents that weighs negatively on the overall welfare calculation. And in the Africa market, 
there is a rectangle of terms of trade gain that will be weighed against a rectangle of rent losses.  
  Gains from preferential liberalization are more likely with high elasticities of the partner 
and low elasticities of excluded countries. This contributes to a rule of thumb that agreements with 
large countries that are likely to have higher supply elasticities are more likely to lead to benefits. 
Imperfect Competition and General Equilibrium Impacts—Why There Are Productivity and 
Welfare Losses Analogous to Trade Diversion 16 
 
In business services such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, maritime and air 
transportation and in selected goods sectors firms operate under increasing returns to scale. In 
these sectors we assume firms price according to a monopolistic competition model with zero 
profits in equilibrium. Users of these goods and services obtain a productivity increase from 
additional varieties through the Dixit-Stiglitz mechanism. Our model contains foreign direct 
investment in business services from each region in the model. Preferential liberalization in 
services entails the reduction in the discriminatory tax on multinationals service providers in a 
particular region, say the EU. This increases profitability for provision of services by EU 
multinational service providers, thereby inducing new entry by EU multinational service 
providers until zero profits are restored for them.  The additional varieties of services from the 
EU service providers induce a productivity gain for users of EU services through the Dixit-
Stiglitz effect.  Preferential liberalization with respect to the EU, however, will imply a 
downward shift in demand and a reduction in profitability for producers from all other regions, 
including the home country. This will induce exit of services providers in the excluded regions 
and the home country until zero profits are restored.  The loss of varieties, from service providers 
from all excluded regions and the home country, results in a loss of productivity for sectors using 
these services.  The lost productivity from lost varieties from the regions excluded and the home 
country from the preferential liberalization in services is analogous to the trade diversion losses 
in perfect competition.
9 Moreover, we find in the sensitivity section that higher elasticities of 
foreign firm supply in the partner country increase the likelihood of welfare gains from 
preferential liberalization (due to greater varieties), while higher elasticities of firm supply in 
                                                            
9 Although we may exclude the home country from the welfare analysis in the perfect competition case, due to the 
Dixit-Stiglitz externality, in imperfect competition and general equilibrium, the home country enters into the welfare 
analysis.  17 
 
excluded regions makes losses more likely (due to greater loss of varieties from excluded 
regions). 
 
IV. Overview of the Tanzanian Service Sectors 
  In this section, we summarize the key institutional and policy issues in 
telecommunications, banking, insurance and transportation. This discussion builds on and 
updates several papers written in 2008 on the Tanzanian business services sectors, namely 
Telecommunications Management Group (2007), Carruthers (2008), Thorburn (2008), Costain 
(2008) and Jensen and Tarr (2008).  Details on the regulatory environment in these sectors are 




The government has implemented significant reforms in the sector since the reform 
program began in 1993. But even as late as the year 2000, there were only 284,000 telephone 
subscribers in the country, of which 174,000 were fixed line subscribers. . By 2009, fixed line 
subscription had not changed significantly as there were only 157,000 fixed line subscribers in 
Tanzania for a population of almost 38 million.  But, mobile telephony has dramatically changed 
things--there were about 17.5 million telephone subscribers in Tanzania who were receiving 
service at very competitive prices from seven mobile telephone service providers. 10 
                                                            
10 For the data see the website of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority at  
http://www.tcra.go.tz/publications/telecom.htm,  18 
 
The Tanzanian telecommunications regulatory environment is based on the modern 
“converged” licensing framework, and is not restrictive regarding entry requirements. The non-
restrictive regulatory environment has introduced competition in the telecommunications sector, 
and should be credited with much of the success of the mobile telephone build-out. Nonetheless 
significant problems remain in the telecommunications sector. Notably: (i) the contract for the 
construction of the national Information and Communication Technology (ICT) backbone 
network was awarded without a transparent tender to an apparently high cost company; (ii) 
internet and data transmission services are very costly; (iii) electronic commerce is seriously 
constrained by the need to develop credit reference bureaus, the lack of a national payments 
system, and a legislative framework appropriate for e-business; and (iv) there is a need to make 
progress in achieving universal service. We now discuss the second problem in more detail.  
Internet service provision and data transmission.  Internet service provision and data 
transmission has been very expensive in Tanzania. The Telecommunications Management Group 
(2007) report notes that in 2004 a monthly basket of internet access services costs US $117, 
whereas the same basket costs an average of US$ 54.8 in sub-Saharan Africa and an average of 
US$45.5 in low income countries. The primary explanation for the high cost of these services is 
that until recently East Africa was the only major coastline in the world without access to a fiber-
optic cable network. In early 2008, these services were provided by satellite services, which are 
more expensive than fiber optic seabed cable. However, the completion of the SEACOM fiber 
optic cable system in 2009 and the expected operation of the EASSy system in mid-2010 should 
lower the costs of internet and data transmission services. A reduction in the costs of internet 
transmission services will likely result in more internet service users.  More internet users will 
likely allow achievement of economies of scale in production that would further reduce costs. 19 
 
We do not, however, see a regulatory problem in this area that would increase our assessment of 
the ad valorem equivalents of non-tariff barriers in telecommunications. 
 
Transportation 
The port of Dar es Salaam. As of early 2008, there were widespread complaints about 
the container terminal at Dar es Salaam. Congestion in the container terminal of the port is the 
greatest transport impediment to an increase in exports. The container terminal was concessioned 
to TICTS in 2000, when the throughput was less than 100,000 tons of equivalent units (TEU). 
By offering a high quality service, the terminal was able to attract much of the traffic of the land-
locked countries for which it is convenient transit port as well as for the rapidly growing 
Tanzanian economy.   
As the throughput approached and passed the nominal capacity of 250,000 TEU and is 
approaching 350,000 in 2008, the number of containers loaded or offloaded per hour fell to less 
than half of what was achieved in 2004 and 2005, at the peak of the port’s efficiency.  The 
average waiting time for ships to access a container berth is twelve days, while the average total 
time for a ship in the port (“dwell time”) is approaching 30 days. This congestion is raising costs 
for both importers and exporters and undermining firms that rely on speed and reliability to 
market. As a result, some shipping lines are reducing the frequency of calls to the port, and one 
major line has stopped service until the situation improves. Long-term solutions to this problem 
require investment and are not the subject of this analysis. There are, however, several regulatory 
problems that have caused problems. These are: (1) the structure of tariffs for the container 
terminal operator does not provide an incentive to move containers out of the port. Container 
terminal operators expect to make most of their revenue from the throughput of containers, and 
this is what happened in the early years of the concession. However, between 2005 and 2008, 
more than half of the revenue (and in 2008 more than three-quarters) came from storage charges, 
and this is possible because of the long dwell times. (2) Present practices require that all 
containers from a ship must arrive at an inland container terminal (ICD) before any containers 
can be released. This increases congestion at the ICDs and extends delays for available 
containers. (3) Shippers have weak incentives to undertake pre-clearance of containers. (4) The 20 
 
container tracking system is not well developed; it sometimes takes days to inform container 
owners that their containers have cleared customs, when it should be done in minutes. And (5) 
container management in inhibited due to multiple measures, such as bureaucratic delays in 
allowing the sue of available space; the requirement that containers from a ship must go to a 
single inland container terminals; the limited use of rail freight services to move containers out 
of the port; and the lack of space in the port that is aggravated by the parking of unnecessary 
equipment in the port (like cars and minibuses).  
In addition to the above primarily non-discriminatory cost increasing regulatory barriers, 
there are discriminatory barriers against foreign firms. A commercial presence in Tanzania is 
required in order to offer shipping services and foreigners are prohibited from operating in 
Tanzania, but must operate through a Tanzanian agent. Moreover, formally, although not in 
practice, the maximum ownership share allowed in a local shipping firm is 1 percent.  
 
  Roads and border crossings. Although many roads are of poor quality, the government 
has received adequate donor support for maintenance and upgrading of the road network.  There 
is, however, considerable scope for improvement in trade facilitation, especially at the borders. 
Border crossings within the East African Customs Union (EAC) are characterized by poor 
infrastructure and facilities, which typically results in long transit delays, poor traffic 
management, traffic jams and congestion at crossing points and parking yards. Delays of several 
days are reported when the ferry from Tanzania arrives in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and in Tanzania for the reverse journey. Similar delays occur at the border with Zambia. 
Anecdotal evidence from newspaper reports suggests that truck delays at the border between 
Tanzania and Kenya often lead to damage to flowers being transported for onward air freight 
from Nairobi. Clearly there are opportunities for improvements to transit arrangements.  
 
To address these problems, the East Africa Customs Union has agreed to move towards 
the implementation of One-Stop Border Posts, which are expected to halve transit time at the 
borders. Moreover, under the World Bank “East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation 21 
 
Project,” nine joint border posts with revenue and transport authorities in the region have been 
selected. Of these, four are between Tanzania and Kenya and one each between Tanzania and 
Rwanda and Uganda. These joint border posts are expected to further facilitate trade.  
Railroads.  Due to a lack of investment, Tanzania’s railways have significantly declined 
and are considered rather poor providers of freight transportation services since the 1980s.  The 
Tanzania Railways Corporation,11 in the hope of improved performance, gave RITES, an Indian 
company, a concession to exclusively operate its routes and invest in the railroads.  As of the end 
of 2007, the RITES concession had only been in operation for several months, and was still in 
the process of rebuilding its track infrastructure and acquiring refurbished and rebuilt 
locomotives and wagons from India. 
Airlines. There is a lack of capacity to handle significant freight shipping. Due to lack of 
capacity in air freight facilities in Dar es Salaam, many Tanzanian cut flower producers choose 
to ship flowers by land to Nairobi, despite the high costs of border delays. 
 
Banking 
Banking sector reform in Tanzania started in the early 1990s and has continued to the 
present. A new regulatory framework has been introduced and new banks have entered the 
market so that there were 25 banks operating in Tanzania in 2007, including Tanzanian, banks 
from within the region (notably South Africa but also Kenya, Botswana and Uganda), from 
OECD countries and from Asia (India, Pakistan and Malaysia). Banking supervision in Tanzania 
complies with many of the “Basel Core Principles.” 
The overall market environment appears to have benefited from increased competition 
and private sector credit has increased significantly while interest rate spreads are estimated to 
have declined from 11% at December 2005 to about 8.6% as at end of December 2006. The 
                                                            
11 The Tanzania Railways Corporation offers service within Tanzania and on to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Burundi and Rwanda. TANZARA offers service between Tanzania and Zambia.  22 
 
move to sell off a controlling stake in National Microfinance Bank (NMB) to a foreign strategic 
investor with strong experience in rural credit appears to have paid off through an introduction of 
innovative new products and approaches to agricultural finance and microfinance. Besides crop 
finance, banks and microfinance institutions have made limited headway in finding secure and 
cost-effective ways of lending for agricultural finance. 
The banking sector, however, performs only a very limited role in the economy, even by 
Sub-Saharan African standards. Private sector credit remains limited, short-term interest rate 
spreads are high, banks continue to invest approximately half their deposits in government 
securities (although loan to deposit ratios have improved in recent years), and banks maintain 
significant offshore foreign currency deposits (about 39% of total deposits as of October 2007). 
Housing finance is negligible as residential mortgages represent less than 1% of all bank loans. 
In order to develop new business models and lending technologies, the key task for 
government will be to ensure the legal and information infrastructures for banks and other 
financial institutions are in place. The general credit culture and institutional framework for 
contract enforcement remains underdeveloped and this has inhibited the growth of financial 
markets. The almost total absence of a mortgage market is a reflection of both the uncertainty 
concerning land title and the inability to enforce a contract. 
Foreign banks, particularly the new entrants, have been challenged in mobilizing local 
currency for lending to match both their capital and institutional capacity. A better-developed 
interbank market would serve to extend the provision of credit within the domestic financial 
system. In 2008, shilling deposits were held largely by the three large domestic banks.  
The efficient operation of the financial markets can be much assisted through the 
effective use of registries such as a land registry, company registry and a movable collateral 
registry. In addition, banks in particular are supported in their lending activities through the use 
of credit information bureaus. While these registries exist in Tanzania, their usefulness has been 
impeded by relatively weak implementation (and, in the case of the credit bureau, limited 
cooperation from the larger banks).  
Although the Bank of Tanzania has substantial operating independence on banking 
supervision matters, some features of the legislation have the potential to compromise its 23 
 
independence. At the same time, despite substantial progress, it would be useful to further 
increase transparency and accountability in the banking supervision procedures of the Bank of 
Tanzania, as well as the development of a risk based approach to banking supervision.  
 
Insurance 
Although the structure of the non-life insurance market is competitive (but not the life 
insurance market), the insurance sector is not well developed. Current regulations impede the 
growth of the sector. These rules include restricting foreign ownership to two-thirds of capital, 
requiring insurers to be locally incorporated entities, not allowing foreign branches or wholly 
owned subsidiaries of foreign insurers, not allowing cooperative and mutual insurance 
companies and limits that make it less attractive for banks to participate in the distribution of 
insurance.  
There are no foreign reinsurance companies operating in Tanzania. This is partly due to 
the fact that reinsurance arrangements have, at their core, compulsory reinsurance requirements 
to TanRe, a company indirectly owned by the government. Moreover, reinsurance companies are 
prohibited to operate as either branches or as wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign domiciled 
reinsurers. Reinsuring externally, and insuring for that matter, also requires approval. 
 
V. Estimation of the Tariff Equivalence of the Regulatory Barriers 
Estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of the regulatory barriers in services are key to 
the results. In order to make these estimates, we first need to assess the regulatory environment 
in the services sectors in our model. We commissioned a 54 page survey of the regulatory 
regimes in key Tanzanian business services sectors, namely, insurance, banking, fixed line and 24 
 
mobile telecommunications services and maritime transportation services. 12 We supplemented 
this information based on the policy notes discussed in section II. The Telecommunications 
Management Group (2007) provided extensive details in telecoms. These questionnaires and 
papers provided us with data and descriptions and assessments of the regulatory environment in 
these sectors.  In the case of professional services, a World Bank team commissioned separate 
surveys of the regulatory environment in several East African countries, including Tanzania. 
These surveys were conducted by local consultants, who interviewed the professional 
associations in the in 2009. For reasons discussed below, we used engineering services as our 
proxy for all professional services.  
Mircheva (2008) then estimated the ad valorem equivalents of barriers to foreign direct 
investment in fixed line and mobile telecommunications, banking, insurance and maritime 
transportation services. The process involved converting the answers and data of the 
questionnaires into an index of restrictiveness in each industry. Mircheva followed the 
methodology of Kimura, Ando and Fujii (2004a, 2004b, 2004c) to generate these estimates. The 
methodology involves classification of the possible restrictions into separate categories with 
unique weights summing to one, where the weights are determined based on the significance of 
each category. Next, Mircheva assigned a score to each potential restriction, where the score 
reflects the level of restriction imposed by the economy. Mircheva estimated two indices: an 
index of “regulatory barriers” (RB index) where the regulatory barriers impose costs on both 
domestic and multinational firms in a non-discriminatory manner; and an index of discriminatory 
barriers against multinational service providers, which we call the foreign discriminatory index 
(FDR index).13   
This methodology further involves building on the estimates and methodology explained 
in the volume by C. Findlay and T. Warren (2000), notably papers by Warren (2000), McGuire 
and Schulele (2000) and Kang (2000).  For each of these service sectors, the authors evaluated 
the regulatory environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against 
the regulatory barriers to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of 
                                                            
12  We thank Mr. Cyril Pesha and his law firm associates in Dar es Salaam for leading this research effort.   
13 In order to obtain the estimated score for each restriction, the assigned score is multiplied by the corresponding 
weight. Finally, the estimated scores for all categories are summed to obtain the restrictiveness indices. 25 
 
services. Mircheva (and Kweka in the case of engineering services) then assumed that the 
international regression applies to Tanzania in the case that the above mentioned restrictiveness 
indexes are used. Applying that regression and their assessments of the regulatory environment 
in Tanzania from the questionnaires and other information sources, she estimated the ad valorem 
impact of a reduction in barriers14 both for discriminatory and non-discriminatory barriers. 
Mircheva then weighted her fixed line and mobile telecommunications estimates by their market 
shares to obtain her estimate for communications.  The results of the estimates of the ad valorem 
equivalents of the barriers are listed in table 4.  
In the case of professional services, we used engineering services as a proxy for all 
professional services.  In engineering services, we have the regression results from the paper by 
Ngyuen-Hong (2000). Based on an international data set, he estimates the ad valorem 
equivalents of barriers on trade in engineering services. No such estimates are available for other 
professional services. Since the methodology we employ requires the existence of a cross-
country regression estimate of the impact of barriers to foreign direct investment, we must use 
engineering services as our proxy. The scoring was done by Josaphat Kweka, senior economist 
in the World Bank office in Tanzania. The details of the regulatory regime and the scoring are 
listed as appendix D.  
 
 
VI. Overview of the Model 
 
This paper builds on the algebraic structure of the model of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr 
(2007). Here we provide a general description of the structure described there and provide more 
details where we depart from that structure. There are 52 sectors in the model shown in table 1. 
These include eight imperfectly competitive business services sectors, eleven imperfectly 
competitive manufacturing sectors, nineteen competitive agricultural sectors and fourteen 
competitive manufacturing or services sectors. Primary factors include 8 types of labor grouped 
both according to gender and to one of four levels of education; child labor; agricultural land; 
                                                            
14   Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price impacts. The 
estimates by Mircheva  that we employ are for “discriminatory” barriers against foreign direct investment.  26 
 
mobile capital; sector-specific capital in imperfectly competitive sectors; and primary inputs 
imported by multinational service providers, reflecting specialized management expertise or 
technology of the firm. The existence of sector specific capital in the imperfectly competitive 
sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of the mobile factors and 
supply curves in these sectors slope up.  In our central model, we assume that 50 percent of the 
capital in each of the imperfectly competitive sectors in sector specific. We conduct sensitivity 
analysis with respect to this share by allowing 25 percent and 75 percent of the capital in each 
sector to be sector specific. 
We build on the model and data set for Tanzania in Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2009). 
As in their model, there are three categories of firms in the model: (1) perfectly competitive 
goods and services sectors: (2) imperfectly competitive goods sectors; and (3) imperfectly 
competitive services sectors with foreign direct investment. The cost, production and pricing 
structures in the three categories differ widely. The principal extension is that we disaggregate 
the rest of the world region of JRT into three regions: (1) the European Union; (2) the union of 
the East African Customs Union and SADC, which we call our African region; and (3) the Rest 
of the World. In the imperfectly competitive sectors, this requires introducing different firm 
types with distinct cost structures for each region. We retain the small open economy model 
framework, so only Tanzania is modeled fully.  
Perfectly Competitive Goods and Services Sectors 
Regardless of sector, all firms minimize the cost of production. In the competitive goods 
and services sectors, goods or services are produced under constant returns to scale and where 
price equals marginal costs with zero profits. This includes all 19 of the agriculture sectors, some 
food processing sectors such as meat and dairy products and grain milling, and services such as 
construction, hotels and restaurants, postal communication, real estate, public administration, 
health and education. In these sectors, products are differentiated by country of origin, i.e., we 
employ the Armington assumption. All goods producing firms (including imperfectly 
competitive firms) can sell on the domestic market or export.  Firms optimize their output 
decision between exports and domestic sales based on relative prices and their constant elasticity 
of transformation production function. Having chosen how much to allocate between exports and 27 
 
domestic sales, firms also optimize their output decision between exports to the three possible 
export regions, based on relative prices the three regions and their constant elasticity of 
transformation production function for shifting output between the regions. 
Tourism is one of the sectors in this category, and given its importance in the Tanzanian 
economy, it deserves its own discussion. All sales to tourists are considered exports, i.e., the 
sector does not produce for the domestic market. Based on a survey (discussed below), we have 
that the inputs of the sector are domestic transportation services, hotel and restaurant services, 
clothing, gold items, and certain food products, as well as foreign inputs such as international 
travel expenditures. Given that we have data only on tourist expenditure by sector and on tourism 
imports and exports, we assume that the output of this sector is produced without value added. 
But the tourism sector demands domestically produced services and goods that lead to value-
added in the Tanzanian economy. Moreover, the sector is intensive in services and this way we 
capture the impacts on services liberalization on services exports. We discuss the special data 
issues related to this sector in the data section below. 
Goods Produced Subject to Increasing Returns to Scale 
These goods are differentiated at the firm level. We assume that manufactured goods may 
be produced domestically or imported for firms in any region in the model. Firms in these 
industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) equals marginal revenue; and 
there is free entry, which drives profits to zero. For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed 
primary factor and intermediate inputs to that sector in the base year data. Foreigners produce the 
goods abroad at constant marginal cost but incur a fixed cost of operating in Tanzania. The cif 
import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the import price, and, by the zero profits 
assumption, in equilibrium the import price must cover fixed and marginal costs of foreign firms. 
Domestic firms set prices using the Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition 
assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in constant markups over marginal 
cost for both foreign firms and domestic firms. 
We have made one significant modeling extension in the imperfectly competitive sectors 
compared to the Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2007) model. In the Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr  
model, domestic firms faced a perfectly elastic demand curve on export markets and they 28 
 
exported at marginal costs. In this model, all imperfectly competitive domestic firms (both goods 
and services producers) face a downward sloping demand curve in each of their three export 
markets. Consistent with firm level product differentiation, we assume that the elasticity of 
demand in each of the export markets is the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of demand. Firms then set 
marginal revenue equal to marginal costs in each of the three export markets; then the export 
market contribute to the quasi-rents of the firm and affect the entry and exit decisions of firms.  
Introducing downward sloping demand curves into the model means that there are 
possible terms of trade affects to consider in this model that were not present in the Jensen, 
Rutherford and Tarr model. Balistreri and Markusen (2009) have shown, however, that there 
should be virtually no role for optimal tariffs to exploit terms of trade effects. The reason is that, 
unlike perfectly competitive firms, imperfectly competitive firms are pricing such than marginal 
revenue equals marginal costs on export markets, which is the objective of optimal tariffs.    
For simplicity we assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in 
all firms producing under increasing returns to scale (in both goods and services). This 
assumption in a our Dixit-Stiglitz based Chamberlinian large-group model assures that output per 
firm for all firm types remains constant, i.e., the model does not produce rationalization gains or 
losses.  
The number of varieties affects the productivity of the use of imperfectly competitive 
goods based on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. The effective cost function for users of 
goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale declines in the total number of firms in the 
industry.  
Service Sectors That Are Produced under Increasing Returns to Scale and Imperfect 
Competition 
These sectors are telecommunications, financial services, transportation services and 
professional business services. In these services sectors, we observe that some services are 
provided by foreign service providers on a cross border basis analogous to goods providers from 
abroad. But a large share of business services are provided by service providers with a domestic 29 
 
presence, both multinational and Tanzanian.
15 Our model allows for both types of foreign service 
provision in these sectors. There are cross border services allowed in this sector and they are 
provided from abroad at constant costs—this is analogous to competitive provision of goods 
from abroad. Cross border services, however, are not good substitutes for service providers who 
have a domestic presence.16 
Crucial to the results, we allow multinational service firm providers that choose to 
establish a presence in Tanzania in order to compete with Tanzanian firms directly.  As in the 
goods sectors, services that are produced subject to increasing returns to scale are differentiated 
at the firm level. Firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) 
equals marginal revenue; and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero.  We assume firm 
level product differentiation and employ the Chamberlinian large group monopolistic 
competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework. Given our assumption on the 
composition of fixed and variable costs, we have constant markups over marginal cost for both 
foreign firms and domestic firms, i.e., no rationalization impacts. 
  For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed primary factors and intermediate 
inputs to that sector in the base year data.  When multinationals service providers decide to 
establish a domestic presence in Tanzania, they will import some of their technology or 
management expertise. That is, foreign direct investment generally entails importing specialized 
foreign inputs. Thus, the cost structure of multinationals differs from national only service 
providers. Multinationals incur costs related to both imported primary inputs and Tanzanian 
primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. Foreign provision of services differs 
from foreign provision of goods, since the service providers use Tanzanian primary inputs. 
Domestic service providers do not import the specialized primary factors available to the 
multinationals. Hence, domestic service firms incur primary factor costs related to Tanzanian 
labor and capital only.  These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. 
For multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and 
                                                            
15 One estimate puts the world-wide cross-border share of trade in services at 41% and the share of trade in services 
provided by multinational affiliates at 38%. Travel expenditures 20% and compensation to employees working 




entry. Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment will induce foreign entry that 
will typically lead to productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are 
available, buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-
Stiglitz variety effect). 
 
VII.  Data of the Model and Evidence for Key Elasticities 
Social Accounting Matrix 
The core of the model data is the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 2001 developed 
by Thurlow and Wobst (2003). The SAM contains 43 sectors, most of which are agricultural and 
food-producing sectors and only a few are service sectors.  
Two sectors in the SAM, “Transport and communication” and "Business and other 
service activities", account for most business services in Tanzania. Given our focus on services, 
these sectors are disaggregated into 10 sectors using unpublished national accounts data for the 
year 2006 from the National Bureau of Statistics of Tanzania.  
Data for gross domestic product for the sectors “Transport”, “Communications”, 
“Financial intermediation”, and “Real estate and business services” is officially published 
(National Bureau of Statistics (2007)). Upon specific request, we received a breakdown of these 
data for the main types of services within each sector. Specifically, the data allows us to 
disaggregate “Transport and communication” into road transport, railway transport, water 
transport, air transport, postal services and telecommunication. "Business and other service 
activities" is disaggregated into insurance, banking, business services and other services. 
Within each of the two aggregate sectors, the share of gross domestic product by 
disaggregate sector is used to decompose the corresponding aggregate sector. It is furthermore 
assumed that the input output structure for all the disaggregate sectors is identical to the input 
output structure of the corresponding aggregate sector. Along with the addition of the tourism 
sector, the resulting table has 52 sectors as shown in table 1.  
The Thurlow and Wobst SAM allocate international travel expenditure (mainly 
international tourism) to the “Transport and communication” sector. According to a survey 31 
 
conducted by the Bank of Tanzania (2007), this is grossly contradicted by the facts. Given our 
focus on services and the importance of tourism to the Tanzanian economy, we had to correct 
this problem.  
In our first step, we reduced imports and exports in the "Transport and communication" 
sector by the value of tourism imports and tourism exports, respectively. This yields levels of 
traditional exports and imports for this sector which are roughly in line with balance of payments 
data from the Bank of Tanzania for these sectors.  
In the second step, we had to reallocate the tourist expenditures subtracted from 
Transportation and Communication to other sectors. Since most of the tourism imports are re-
exported, e.g., international air travel, we chose to calculate net tourism expenditures. We 
allocated the net expenditures to the various sectors of our model based on the Bank of Tanzania 
survey results. 
The survey revealed that around 28% of total expenditure of non-package tourists is 
transport, 29% is accommodation, 12% is shopping and 31% is other expenditure. We therefore 
allocated the cost share of tourism input expenditures to the following sectors: 29% to “Hotels & 
restaurants,” 28% to road transport, railway transport and air transport in proportion to the three 
sectors’ contribution to GDP. The remaining 43% is on goods. We allocate these expenditures to 
the goods producing sectors in proportion to their share in total exports of goods. Major 
examples of tourist expenditure on goods include clothing, gold items, and food products such as 
cashew nuts and coffee.  
This allocation of tourist expenditures implies that our SAM gets additional accounts 
representing “Tourism”. An activity account (the tourism sector) contains the tourism 
expenditure and produces an aggregate tourism commodity. The tourism sector in our SAM does 
not generate value-added itself, but demands domestically produced services and goods (as 
detailed above). Additional exports of tourism therefore indirectly increases value-added in the 
Tanzanian economy. 
An additional commodity account contains the aggregate tourism commodity (the output 
of the domestic tourism activity) and tourism imports. The sum of the two is exported as gross 
tourism exports. 32 
 
The reallocation of tourism expenditure corresponds to a relocation of demands for 
output between sectors. To maintain a balanced SAM a final correction was needed to ensure 
that the value of output equals total demand in each sector. Capital earnings are increased in 
sectors where demand is increased, and decreased in sectors where demand is decreased. 
The SAM includes 12 household accounts. 6 accounts represent rural households and 6 
accounts represent urban households. 2 accounts in each group represent households below the 
food poverty line and between the food and basic needs poverty lines. The other accounts are 
grouped according to the education of the head of the household.17  
The SAM contains nine types of labor: Adults are grouped both according to gender and 
to one of four levels of education. All child labor (age 10 to 14) is the 9th and final category. 
Capital and agricultural land and a factor called a subsistence factor are the three remaining 
primary factors of production.  
The subsistence factor is a composite of land, labor and capital used in the production for 
home (own) consumption by households.18  The subsistence factor is used in the agricultural and 
food-producing sectors. In each sector the SAM shows the value of output allocated for home 
consumption and of output allocated to the market, both of which are coming from the same 
activity.  
 
Trade Data by Regional Partner and Sector 
 
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we 
used trade data for 2007 obtained from WITS access to the COMTRADE database. The regions 
of our model are Tanzania, the European Union, the East African Customs Union plus SADC 
and the Rest of the World. For the European Union, we took the 27 member countries as of 
2007. In appendix A, we calculate and report data for the East African Customs Union and 
                                                            
17 Average per capita income in the SAM is calculated as USD 2.2 per day. This calculation is based on income data 
in the SAM, the number of heads in each of the household accounts as reported by Thurlow and Wobst (2003), and a 
purchasing power parity conversion between Tanzanian Schillings and USD of 274.16 (see Heston et al. (2006)). 
The market exchange rate for 2001 reported by the Bank of Tanzania is 876.4 Tanzanian Schillings per USD. 
18 Data do not allow a breakdown of the subsistence factor on its shares of the other primary factors. 33 
 
SADC separately. For the East African Customs Union, we took Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and 
Burundi. For SADC we took Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Trade shares for the “Africa” region in our model are the sum of East Africa 
Customs Union plus SADC. Rest of the World is the residual.  
We mapped two digit sectors from the COMTRADE database into the sectors of our 
model. The exact mapping is defined in appendix A.  We used Tanzania as the reporter country 
for both exports and imports. Results for both exports and imports are reported in tables A2 and 
A3 of appendix A.  
 
Tariff Data—Collected Rates at the Tariff Line Level 
We were fortunate to receive unusually detailed collected tariff data from the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority. That is, we received data on collected import duties (tariffs) and import 
values at the eight digit tariff line level. The collected tariff rates for the sectors in our model are 
obtained by first aggregating the eight digit tariff line level tariff collections and import values to 
the sectors of our model. The ratio of tariff collections to import values for each sector of our 
model is then calculated to give estimates of the collected tariff rates, which in turn are 
incorporated into our SAM. The tariff rates are shown in Table 4. Applying these tariff rates 
across all sectors implies that tariff revenue in the revised database is about 1.3% of GDP, which 
is consistent with collected revenues in Tanzania.19  The SAM has some detail on taxes, which 
include direct taxes on households and enterprises, import tariffs, producer taxes, indirect (sales) 
taxes and factor taxes. The data for import tariffs are replaced with collected tariff rate data for 
the year 2006. 
Given that Tanzania participates in preferential trade areas with the East Africa Customs 
Union and the South African Development Community, it was necessary to make further 
adjustments. That is, since, in principle, tariff rates should be zero within these preferential trade 
areas, we set tariff collections on imports from SADC and EACU (our Africa region) at zero. We 
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then increased the tariff rates for the other regions in our model so that the overall weighted 
average collected tariff rate is unchanged. We used the trade flow data, disaggregated by regions 
and sectors of our model to weight the tariff rates. This adjustment has the impact of raising the 
collected tariff rates for the regions in our model where positive tariff rates apply. The resulting 
adjusted tariff rates are reported in Table 4. 
Share of Market Captured by Multinational Service Providers  
It was necessary to calculate the market share of multinational firms in the services 
sectors by region of the model.  Take the banking sector as an example. We need to know the 
share of the market captured by Tanzanian, EU, African and Rest of the World firms, where the 
countries in the regions are defined in table 1. This entailed acquiring a list of all banks operating 
in Tanzania along with their market share, and, when the bank is owned by multiple parties, 
allocating the ownership across the regions of our model. The database Bankscope was sufficient 
for this task in most cases, but websites of the banks had to be consulted to allocate ownership 
shares in several cases. The results, by region and sector, are presented in table 6. Documentation 
of the results, with listing by firm, sector and region, and the data sources are presented in 
appendix B.  
 
Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service Providers  
The impact of liberalization of barriers to foreign direct investment in business services 
sectors on the demand for labor in these sectors will depend importantly on the share of 
expatriate labor used by multinational firms. We explain in the results section that despite the 
fact that multinationals use Tanzanian labor less intensively than their Tanzanian competitors, if 
multinationals use mostly Tanzanian labor, their expansion is likely to increase the demand for 
Tanzanian labor in these sectors.20  We obtained estimates of the share of expatriate labor or 
specialized technology not available to Tanzanian firms that is used by multinational service 
providers in Tanzania from the survey mentioned above. We found that multinational service 
providers use mostly local primary factor inputs and only small amounts of expatriate labor or 
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specialized technology. Our estimated share of foreign inputs used by multinationals in Tanzania 
is presented in the table on sensitivity analysis. 
Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution for Goods 
It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities 
of substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua 
Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of 
substitution at the 3 digit level in 73 countries. Among the 73 countries, there were four in sub-
Saharan Africa: the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius. We judged 
that Madagascar was the country closest in characteristics to Tanzania, so we took the values of 
the elasticities estimated for Madagascar as a proxy for the elasticities for Tanzania. We explain 
in appendix C, how we mapped the 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors estimated by Broda 
et al. into the sectors of our model. The mapping and resulting elasticities by relevant sector in 
our model are shown in table C1.  
Elasticities of varieties with respect to price--evidence on the role of trade and FDI in 
increasing total factor productivity through technology transfer as a function of research 
and development intensity of the trading partner 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) have developed models of economic growth that have 
highlighted the role of trade in a greater variety of intermediate goods as a vehicle for 
technological spillovers that allow less developed countries to close the technological gap with 
industrialized countries.  Similarly, Romer (1994) has argued that product variety is a crucial and 
often overlooked source of gains to the economy from trade liberalization. In our model, it is the 
greater availability of varieties that is the engine of productivity growth, but we believe there are 
other mechanisms as well through which trade may increase productivity.21 Consequently, we 
take variety as a metaphor for the various ways increased trade can increase productivity. 
Winters et al. (2004) summarize the empirical literature by concluding that “the recent empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that openness and trade liberalization have a strong influence on 
                                                            
21 Trade or services liberalization may increase growth indirectly through its positive impact on the development of 
institutions (see Rodrik, Subramananian and Trebbi, 2004).  It may also induce firms to move down their average 
cost curves, or import higher quality products or shift production to more efficient firms within an industry.  Tybout 
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productivity and its rate of change.” Some of the key articles regarding product variety are the 
following. Broda and Weinstein (2004) find that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 
1.2 percent per year in the “true” import price index. Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott 
(2004) have shown that product variety and quality are important in explaining trade between 
nations. Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of exports in a sector increases total 
factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) and Korea, and they have 
some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor productivity. In business 
services, because of the high cost of using distant suppliers, the close availability of a diverse set 
of business services may be even more important for growth than in goods. The evidence for this 
was cited in the introduction section. 
Beginning with the path-breaking work of Coe and Helpman (1995), a rich literature now 
exists that has empirically investigated the transmission of knowledge through the purchase of 
imported intermediate goods and through foreign direct investment.  Coe and Helpman found 
that OECD countries benefit from foreign research and development (R&D), that they benefit 
more from trading with countries that have a larger stock of research and development, and that 
the benefits are greater the more open the country is to foreign trade.  Moreover, while in large 
countries the elasticity of total factor productivity (TFP) with respect to domestic R&D capital 
stocks is larger than that with respect to foreign R&D capital stocks, the opposite holds in small 
countries; that is, foreign R&D is more important for small countries.  Coe, Helpman, and 
Hoffmaister (1997) extend these results based on a sample of 77 developing countries. They find 
developing countries that do little R&D on their own, have benefited substantially from 
industrialized country R&D through trade in intermediate products and capital equipment with 
industrialized countries. They find that R&D spillovers through trade with the U.S. are the 
largest, since the U.S. stock of R&D is the highest and it is the most important trading partner for 
many developing countries. A 1 percent increase in the R&D stock of the U.S. raises total factor 
productivity for all 77 developing countries in their sample by 0.03 percent. By comparison, a 1 
percent increase in the R&D stock of Japan, Germany, France or the U.K. raises total factor 
productivity only between 0.004 percent and 0.008 percent. Crucially, they find that countries 
that trade more with the U.S., such as the Latin American countries, get more productivity 
spillover increases from the U.S. R&D stocks. And the relatively more open East Asian countries 
have benefited the most from foreign R&D through trade.  Keller (2000) also finds that trade is 37 
 
an important conveyor of R&D and is especially important for small countries.  Several other 
studies, including Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005), Schiff et al., (2002) and Falvey et al., (2002), 
confirm these results. Lumenga-Neso et al. (2005) show that technological spillovers can occur 
from indirect trade with technologically advanced countries. i.e., imports from the U.K. embody 
some U.S. technology due to U.K. imports from the U.S.. Since the data show that OECD 
countries have the vast majority of R&D stocks,
22 it implies that it is important for small 
developing countries to trade with large technologically rich countries, such as the U.S. and the 
EU, at least indirectly. 
Regarding the impact of FDI on the productivity of firms, the results depend on intra-
industry versus inter-industry impacts. Since FDI in the same industry may bring spillovers, but 
has an adverse competitive or market share impact, the literature has found mixed results on the 
productivity of firms in the same industry that receives the FDI.  But several papers have found 
significant productivity spillovers from FDI in both upstream (supplying) industries (e.g., 
Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and Gertler, 2008; and Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008) and downstream 
(using) industries (e.g., Wang, forthcoming; Jabbour and Mucchielli, 2007; and Harris and 
Robinson, 2004).  Saggi (2006) summarizes the theory and additional empirical papers that show 
the spillovers of FDI on supplying industries.  Regarding FDI in services, Arnold, Mattoo and 
Javorcik (2007) show that in the Czech Republic, services sector liberalization led to increased 
productivity of downstream industries, and the key channel through which reform led to 
increased productivity was allowing foreign entry.  Fernandes and Paunov (2008) found a 
positive and significant effect of foreign direct investment in services on productivity growth in 
Chile.  Fernandes (2007) finds a positive and significant effect of services liberalization in both 
finance and infrastructure on the productivity of downstream manufacturing in the fifteen 
Eastern European countries.  
Schiff and Wang (2006) estimate the relative importance for technology diffusion to 
developing countries of trade with industrialized versus developing countries. They note that 
technology from the industrialized countries may indirectly diffuse to a developing country 
through trade with another developing country, if the other developing country has traded with 
industrialized countries. They conclude that trade with industrialized countries has a stronger 
                                                            
22 Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) calculate that 96 percent of the world’s R&D expenditures took place in 
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impact on productivity in developing countries and that spillovers from developing country trade 
occurs with more of a lag. They find that the elasticity of productivity (TFP) with respect to 
current trade with all industrialized countries is 0.16, but only 0.01 for current trade with all 
developing countries. That is, trade with the industrialized countries in 16 times better for 
productivity spillovers. In addition, since trade may be expected to have an impact on 
productivity with a lag, Schiff and Wang estimate the impact of lagged trade with developing 
countries. They find that the productivity spillovers from current trade with industrialized 
countries are only about 1.5 times greater than the productivity spillovers from lagged trade with 
developing countries.
23 Moreover, Schiff et al. (2002) show that developing country trade with 
technologically advanced countries is very important in technology intensive sectors, but trade 
with developing countries can be important for productivity spillovers in less technologically 
complex products in which developing countries have comparative advantage. So on low R&D 
products like footwear and textiles and apparel, trade with China and Indonesia could be as 
important for technology diffusion as trade with the EU and the US.  
In summary, this literature shows that the purchase of intermediate inputs and FDI from 
industrialized countries is an important mechanism for the transmission of R&D and productivity 
growth in developing countries. For small developing countries, trading with large 
technologically advanced countries is crucial for TFP growth.  But for products in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage, developing country trade may be important 
for spillovers.  
In our model, the parameter that reflects the ability of a region to increase total factor 
productivity through the transmission of new technologies is the elasticity of varieties with 
respect to the price.  Schiff et al., (2002, table 1) have shown that for R&D intensive sectors, 
trade with industrialized countries contributes significantly to total factor productivity in 
developing countries, but trade with developing countries does not. Averaging over the industries 
in Schiff et al.,( 2002, table 3) yields that trade with industrialized countries in R&D intensive 






hand, for sectors that are low in R&D intensity, their results suggest that for technology diffusion 
trade with developing countries can be as important as trade with industrialized countries.  
Based on these considerations, we first classify the increasing returns to scale sectors of 
our model into low, medium and high technology sectors. The classification is defined by the 
share of R&D expenditures in total sales, based on U.S. data.  For low R&D intensive sectors, 
we assume that the elasticity of firms with respect to price is the same for the Africa region as for 
the EU, but the elasticity is only one-third of Rest of the World elasticity (trade with the Africa 
or EU regions misses out on trade with China or the U.S.). For medium and high R&D intensive 
sectors, we assume that trade and FDI with the Africa region is only one-eigth as valuable as 
trade with the Rest of the World (as discussed above), while trade with the EU is two-thirds as 
valuable as trade with the Rest of the World. Finally, we allow the elasticity of the Rest of the 
World to vary depending on the R&D intensity of the sector, where we allow for more 
technology diffusion in more R&D intensive sectors. The results of these assumptions are in 
table 6b.  
To determine the impact of this parameter on the results, we conduct three types of 
sensitivity analysis on these parameters: systematic sensitivity analysis, piecemeal sensitivity 
analysis and a third where we simulate the model 100 times. When we conduct sensitivity 
analysis, we scale all the elasticities from 0.5 times their central values to 1.5 times their central 
values.  
 
VIII. Results for Preferential Reduction of All Services Barriers—Central Elasticity Case 
We execute several scenarios to assess the impacts of Tanzania entering into a bilateral 
free trade agreement that includes services with the European Union, and similarly with the 
Africa region. In these scenarios we assume that Tanzanian ad valorem equivalents of the 
barriers against foreign investors in services are reduced by 50 percent with respect to the region 
with which Tanzania has an agreement. We assume that Tanzania already offers tariff free access 
to goods originating from its African trade partners, so in the scenario where we evaluate the 
agreement with the Africa region we include only liberalization of discriminatory barriers against 
foreign investors in services. Insofar as combining preferential trade agreements could 40 
 
potentially reduce trade diversion inherent in separate agreements (see, e.g., Harrison, Rutherford 
and Tarr, 2002, 2004), we examine the impacts of the combination of free trade agreements with 
both the Africa region and the European Union. We compare these impacts with unilateral non-
discriminatory liberalization. Finally, given our earlier result on the importance of reducing non-
discriminatory barriers against investors in service, we examine the impact of a 50 percent 
reduction of non-discriminatory barriers against service providers combined with unilateral 
liberalization of discriminatory barriers.     
As discussed above, who captures the rents from the barriers is important for the welfare 
results. Consequently, for each policy scenario, we execute two versions of the model with our 
central elasticities. In one case, we assume that Tanzanians do not capture any rents from the 
barriers. In the second scenario, we assume that the discriminatory barriers generate rents that are 
captured by Tanzanians.  In our systematic sensitivity analysis, in each of the 30,000 scenarios, 
we allow the share of rents captured by Tanzanians to vary stochastically between zero and one. 
In a section below, we focus on the impacts in professional services by considering the same set 
of policy experiments where we allow reduction in services barriers only in professional 
services.  
Aggregate Effects 
We first discuss (and present results in tables 7 and 8) our estimates of the full reform 
scenario in our central elasticities case. In these tables we present results on the impacts on 
aggregate variables including welfare, the real exchange rate, aggregate exports and imports, the 
return to capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor and the percentage change in tariff revenue. In 
order to obtain an estimate of the adjustment costs, we estimate the percentage of each of our 
factors of production that have to change industries.  
  Gains with the EU—deriving primarily from services liberalization.  We estimate that 
the preferential arrangement with the EU that includes both goods and services would generate 
gains for Tanzania of 0.35 percent of consumption with no initial rent capture and 0.27 percent 
of consumption if there is initial rent capture by Tanzanians. The gains come primarily from the 
preferential liberalization of services, although the relative contribution is much larger with no 
initial rent capture. That is, the gains to Tanzania from preferential liberalization of tariffs with 41 
 
the EU are invariant to the rent capture assumption at 0.05 percent of consumption. But, if there 
is initial rent capture, the gains to Tanzania of preferential liberalization of services fall from 
0.30 percent of consumption to 0.22 percent of consumption. 
  Small gains from preferential liberalization with the Africa region. In the case of 
preferential liberalization with the Africa region, the gains are smaller—0.10 percent of 
consumption in the case of no initial rent capture and 0.03 percent of consumption in the case of 
rent capture initially by Tanzania. The agreement with the EU includes tariff reduction, while 
tariff free access in the Africa region is considered part of the status quo; so the appropriate 
scenario for comparison of the relative gains for Tanzania is the scenario in the second column of 
the results tables, labeled “EU discriminatory services.” With no initial rent capture, the gains for 
Tanzania of an agreement with the EU are three  times greater than the gains from an agreement 
with the Africa region. With initial rent capture, gains of an agreement with the EU are seven 
times greater than the gains from an agreement with the Africa region.  We show in the 
sensitivity section that there is a small possibility of losses from an agreement with the Africa 
region in the initial rent capture case.  
  Why are the gains larger for the agreement with the “northern” region?  As we 
discussed  above,  trade  with  and  FDI  from  large  technologically  advanced  regions  can  be 
expected to lead to technology diffusion that increases total factor productivity. Although trade 
and FDI from small developing countries can contribute to technology diffusion, it has been 




24  Table 21 shows that we estimate that the number of varieties from the EU substantially 
increases as a result of preferential liberalization with the EU, while table 18 shows that the 
estimated expansion of varieties from the Africa region is much more modest in response to 
                                                            
24 The elasticity of supply corresponds to the share of the sector’s costs that are due to a specific factor of 
production.  In all of the imperfectly competitive sectors, we assume there are four specific factors: one for each 
region in the model. Then, as industry output expands, the price of the specific factor necessary for production of 
that variety increases, thereby increasing the cost of production of firms. Since the cost of production of firms 
increases as the industry supply increases, the supply curve of each region will slope up in each of these sectors. 
And higher cost shares of the specific factor will lead to less elastic supply curves in that sector. 42 
 
preferential liberalization with respect to the African region.  We show in the sensitivity analysis 
below that this elasticity of supply parameter is very important for the results: preferential 
agreements in services are more likely to be beneficial the higher the supply elasticities of the 
partner country’s services suppliers and the lower the supply elasticities of the excluded 
countries services suppliers.  
More substantial gains from combining the Africa FTA with a FTA with Europe.  In 
tables 7 and 8, in the column labeled “EU-Africa FTA,” we show our estimates for the impacts 
of agreeing to a FTA with both the EU and the Africa region. The estimated gains are 
approximately the sum of the separate agreements. This shows that Tanzania can significantly 
augment the gains it may realize from an agreement with the Africa region, by adding a FTA 
with the EU.  
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) found that, for Chile, the gains from combining free 
trade agreements would be more than additive. Harrison, Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel (2004) 
found similar results for Brazil. That is, the gains of the two agreements combined exceeded the 
gains of the two separate agreements. The reason is that if Chile, for example,  agreed to a free 
trade agreement with the U.S., then competition from the U.S. would greatly reduce the trade 
diversion associated with an agreement with neighboring developing countries. But there are the 
possibilities of trade diversion with the rest of the world region, so the gains from combined 
agreements are not necessarily greater than the gains from the separate agreements. 
  Non-discriminatory liberalization would result in a six-fold increase in the gains 
compared with preferential liberalization with the EU.  With non-discriminatory 
liberalization, Tanzanians would be able to access goods and services from the least cost supplier 
in the world. This would eliminate all trade diversion losses, reduce any adverse terms of trade 
losses and result in the maximum number of new foreign varieties for productivity improvement 
from trade and FDI liberalization. Consequently, the gains are much larger in this case.  Because 
the rest of the world has a much larger share of the goods market in Tanzania than it enjoys in 
the services sectors, the gains from non-discriminatory liberalization come more from 
liberalization of goods than from services.  43 
 
The largest gains come from reduction in the barriers that domestic as well as 
foreign firms face.    Consistent with the work of Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) in a model 
with an aggregate rest of the world, we find that the largest gains for Tanzania would come from 
liberalization of the non-discriminatory barriers in services. That is, when we estimate the impact 
of a 50 percent reduction in the non-discriminatory services barriers on top of unilateral 
liberalization of all discriminatory services barriers, the estimated gains are 7.0 percent of 
consumption  with no rent capture or 5.4 percent of consumption with initial rent capture.  
 
Sector Impacts 
  In table 9, we present results for the percentage change in output by sector for four 
scenarios: an FTA with the EU; and FTA with the Africa region; and FTA with the EU and the 
Africa region combined; and unilateral liberalization. Details of what is included in these 
scenarios are explained in table 7.   
  In general we see an expansion of the output of the business services sectors in all 
scenarios. Multinational firms in the business services sectors are located in the home country 
and their output is defined as part of industry output. Reduction of barriers against one partner 
regions, generally reduces the number of firms from the other three regions in the model, but on 
balance the output of the sector expands.  To see what happens to EU firms, versus Tanzanian 
and other firms, it is necessary to view the tables that report the change in the number of firms by 
scenario.   
Outside of business services, we estimate that the tourism and hotel and restaurant sectors 
are the sectors that will expand the greatest (tourism almost doubles in size with unilateral 
liberalization). The tourism sector is an intensive user of business services, such as transportation 
and banking services. Regulatory reforms will decrease the price and allow for quality 
improvements in these business services, which permits the tourism sector to operate more 
cheaply and offer better quality services.  
Given that we assume that total employment and the capital stock are fixed in the 
medium term, if labor expands in some sectors, it must contract in other sectors. Given the large 44 
 
expansion in several sectors, especially services, we must have declines in others in the medium 
term. We estimate declines in output in several sectors, especially those that use business 
services less intensively. Moreover, since we assume zero tariffs in our unilateral reform 
scenario, sugarcane, which is the one of the more highly protected sector, is estimated to decline.  
The stark result from table 9 is that for sectors that experience output declines, the contractions 
are generally much more moderate in the regional preferential scenarios than in the unilateral 
scenario. This follows from the less substantial drop in overall protection to any sector.  
 
IX. Sensitivity Analysis 
  In this section we assess the impact of parameter values and key modeling assumptions 
on the results. Through our “piecemeal sensitivity analysis” we will determine the most 
important parameters for the results, and we will assess how important for the results are rent 
capture or additional varieties from reform in services sectors under increasing returns to scale.  
In the piecemeal sensitivity analysis, we change the value of a single parameter while holding the 
values of all other parameters unchanged at our central elasticity values. We present piecemeal 
sensitivity analysis of the two most relevant policy scenarios. In table 22, we examine the 
prospective free trade agreement with the EU and in table 23, we examine the agreement with 
the Africa region.  
Given uncertainty of parameter values and the rent capture assumption, point estimates of 
the results may be viewed with skepticism. In our “systematic sensitivity analysis,” we execute 
30,000 simulations.  In each simulation, we allow the computer to randomly select the values of 
all parameters, subject to the specified probability distributions of the parameters.  Through the 
systematic sensitivity analysis we will be able to assess how robust the results are and obtain 
confidence intervals of the results.   
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In the row labeled θr we retain the increasing returns to scale assumption in the services 
sectors and selected goods sectors, but allow initial rent capture in the services sectors to be 
either zero (central value ) or 100 percent (upper value). We see that there is approximately a 20 
percent reduction in the welfare gain from a free trade agreement with the EU if rents are 
captured initially (from a welfare gain of 0.35 percent of consumption to 0.27 percent of 
consumption).  In the case of an agreement with the African region, the gains fall even more 
dramatically in percentage terms, from a welfare gain of 0.10 percent of consumption to 0.03 
percent of consumption in our central elasticity case. We show below, that with initial rent 
capture, there are parameter values that result in negative welfare changes for an agreement with 
the Africa region.  
Impact of Constant Returns to Scale—Possible Negative Welfare Effects 
  In the row labeled θr –CRTS model, we assume constant returns to scale in all sectors, 
which eliminates the Dixit-Stiglitz externality from additional varieties. We allow initial rent 
capture in the services sectors to be either zero (central value) or 100 percent (upper value). We 
see that without the Dixit-Stiglitz variety externality, the gains from an agreement with the EU 
fall dramatically and can be negative with the Africa region. With no initial rent capture, the 
gains for the EU agreement would be approximately 0.04 percent of consumption and would fall 
to -0.03 with initial rent capture. In the case of an agreement with the Africa region, the gains are 
0.05 with no initial rent capture and are -0.02 with initial rent capture.  
Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis 
  Three parameters stand out as having a strong impact on the results. The elasticity of 
substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive services sectors, σ(qi, qj) has a 
very strong impact.  Following from the Le Chatelier principle, larger elasticities typically lead 
to larger welfare gains in response to welfare improving reforms, as the economy can adapt more 
readily.  Unlike other elasticities, however, a lower value of σ(qi,qj) increases the welfare gains. 
This is because lower values of this elasticity imply that varieties are less close to each other, so 
additional varieties are worth more.  Since the policy shocks in goods are much less, the same 
elasticity variation in goods has a much smaller impact.  The elasticity of substitution between 
value-added and business services, σ(va, bs), also has a strong  impact. The better firms are able 46 
 
to substitute business services for labor and capital, the more the economy will gain from the 
reforms that reduce the quality adjusted price of business services.  Finally, for the agreement 
with the EU, a strong impact comes from changes in the value of εEU, the elasticity of EU 
multinational service firm supply with respect to the price of EU services in Tanzania. Larger 
values of this parameter mean that tariff preferences that open opportunities for EU service firms 
to provide new varieties, will not be so quickly choked by the increased cost of the specific 
factor required for EU firm expansion. Similarly, for the agreement with the Africa region, εAFR, 
the elasticity of African multinational service firm supply with respect to the price of African 
services in Tanzania has a strong impact. We conduct more detailed sensitivity analysis on this 
parameter below.  
 
Impact of Partner and Excluded Country Elasticities of Multinational Service Firm 
Supply—why it is more likely to obtain gains from large technologically advanced partners 
In figures 4 and 5, we depict the impact and interrelationship of the elasticities of firm 
supply from partner and excluded countries.  In figure 4, we examine the estimates for the 
welfare effects in Tanzania of a 50 percent preferential reduction of barriers in services against 
African partners.  On the vertical axis is the set of elasticities of firm supply of African partners 
with respect to price (values by sector are shown in table 6B). We scale this set of elasticities 
from one-half to twice the central values.  On the horizontal axis we scale the central values of 
the elasticities of firm supply of all excluded countries from one-half of their central values to 
twice their central values.  Excluded regions in the case are the EU and Rest of the World.  In 
figure 5, we do analogous simulations, except that since the preferential liberalization is with the 
EU, the EU elasticities are on the vertical axis and we scale the elasticities of the African region 
and the Rest of the World on the horizontal axis.  In the left hand side panel, we present results 
with no initial rent capture, but initial rent capture is shown on the right hand side panel. 
Regarding preferential reduction of barriers with African partners, we see in figure 4 that, 
with initial rent capture, there is a range of elasticities that result in losses for Tanzania. Without 
initial rent capture, however, there are gains for all these values, albeit small gains.   47 
 
We see from figures 4 and 5 that the gains to the home country increase the higher the 
elasticity of supply of firms in partner countries and the lower the elasticity of supply of firms in 
excluded countries, with the partner country elasticity being the more important.  Preferential 
reduction of barriers, leads to an increase in firms (varieties) and productivity from partner 
countries, but a loss of service providers (varieties) from all excluded regions and the home 
country, results in a loss of productivity for sectors using these services.  The lost productivity 
from lost varieties from the regions excluded and the home country from the preferential 
liberalization in services is analogous to the trade diversion losses in perfect competition.  When 
firm elasticities in partner countries are high, the after tax price increase for firms in partner 
countries from preferential reduction of barriers induces a large increase in partner country 
varieties, boosting productivity.  For excluded countries, the price decrease of partner countries 
shifts in demand for their products and lowers their price; but the lower price induces fewer lost 
varieties when firms in excluded countries have low elasticities.  In addition to the variety 
impacts in imperfect competition, as explained above, in perfect competition the rent and terms 
of trade impacts reinforce the argument that high elasticities of partners and low elasticities of 
excluded countries increase the likelihood of welfare gains from a preferential agreement in 
services.  
 
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis  
  In the systematic sensitivity analysis, we execute the model 30,000 times and harvest the 
results for desired variables. In each individual simulation, we allow the computer to select 
values of all the parameters in the model (the parameters in table 22), based on the specified 
probability density functions (pdfs) of the parameters. We assume uniform probability density 
functions, with upper and lower values of the pdfs given by the upper and lower values in the 
piecemeal sensitivity analysis table. We include initial rent capture in the systematic sensitivity 
analysis, with the rent capture parameter allowed to take values between zero and one with a 
uniform pdf.   
  The results for preferential reduction of barriers with African partners on welfare, output 
and labor are shown in figures 6-8 and similar figures for the preferential trade agreement with 48 
 
the EU in figures 9-11. The welfare results for preferential reduction of barriers in services with 
the Africa region, depicted in figure 6, are rather robust and somewhat skewed toward larger 
gains.  A 95 percent confidence interval for equivalent variation as a percent of consumption is: 
.031 to .241 around a sample mean of .097. There is a negative value for equivalent variation in 
only two of the simulations.   
  The welfare results for a free trade agreement with the EU that includes services are 
depicted in figure 9.  A 95 percent confidence interval for equivalent variation as a percent of 
consumption is: .217 to .877 around a sample mean of .399. There are no simulations with 
negative estimated welfare changes.  
  In figures 7 and 10, we show “box and whisper” diagrams for the sample distribution of 
the percentage change in output by sector.  Sectors are on the horizontal axis and the percentage 
change in output is shown on the vertical axis. The bars in the box are the means of the 
distributions. Fifty percent confidence intervals are depicted by the boxes, while the vertical lines 
show 95 percent confidence intervals.  
The means of the systematic sensitivity results show a similar pattern to the point 
estimates regarding the expansion of the services sectors. While the confidence intervals are 
rather tight for most sectors, they reveal a large range of uncertainty for several sectors. With 
respect to the EU agreement, while the sign of the direction of change does not change within the 
95 percent confidence interval, the confidence intervals of expected output change are large for 
tourism, water transportation, cashew nuts. The sign does change, however, for the output effect 
on the coffee sector, suggesting considerable uncertainty for this result. Regarding negative 
output impacts, results appear rather robust within a 95 percent confidence interval. For the 
Africa agreement, most sectors have tight confidence intervals, but the insurance, water 
transportation and coffee sectors have a large range of uncertainty (including some sign changes 
on the direction of the impact), so the sensitivity analysis reveals that we can not a great deal of 
confidence in the sign of the impacts for these three sectors.  
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  In these scenarios we consider the impact of a preferential reduction in barriers in 
professional services, but assume that there is no reduction of barriers in other services sectors. 
We execute the same policy scenarios that we executed in the earlier section, where all services 
barriers are reduced on a preferential basis. The results are shown in tables 24-27. In table 24, we 
assume no initial rent capture, but in table 25, we assume initial rent capture. 
We find that preferential liberalization of professional services with respect to its African 
regional partners would be slightly beneficial for Tanzania in our central elasticity case with no 
initial rent capture, but virtually valueless with initial rent capture.  But if preferential 
liberalization with the Africa region is combined with an agreement with the EU, the gains (in 
the no initial rent capture case) would increase five times.  If the liberalization of professional 
services commitments is extended to all foreign partners (called “unilateral” in the tables), the 
gains would increase by eleven times. Thus, these results suggest that preferential liberalization 
in the region may be a useful, but wider liberalization, with larger partners or multilaterally will 
yield much larger gains.  
Finally, we estimate that a serious effort to reduce non-discriminatory regulatory barriers 
(that is, barriers that raise the costs of Tanzanians as well as foreign professional services 
providers in Tanzania) would double the benefits of multilateral liberalization in Tanzania. That 
is, regulatory barriers that are non-discriminatory appear to be at least as costly to Tanzania as 
discriminatory barriers. 
 As we mentioned in section V, we used engineering services as a proxy for all services 
when we estimated the barriers and calculated the market shares of different regions. Experts in 
this field in East Africa have suggested that engineering services are likely less constrained than 
some other services, notably legal services. This would imply that the ad valorem equivalents of 
the barriers would be higher if averaged with the other more protected sectors, and the gains 
from non-discriminatory liberalization would be higher. In some other sectors, like accounting, 
there is a much greater foreign presence.  With higher barriers, discriminatory liberalization with 
the Africa region in accounting could displace a larger number of varieties in a sector like 





In this paper we have developed an innovative small open economy computable general 
equilibrium model of the Tanzanian economy that is capable of assessing the impact of the 
preferential liberalization of barriers against multinational service providers. We have provided a 
discussion of the welfare economics of services liberalization, in which we argue that it is likely 
that the gains from preferential reduction of barriers against multinational services will be larger 
if the partner region is large. We find that Tanzania would obtain small gains from a preferential 
reduction of barriers in services with the Africa region in our central elasticity case.  Gains from 
a free trade agreement with the EU that includes a preferential 50 percent reduction in the ad 
valorem equivalents of the barriers in the services sectors will produce significant gains for 
Tanzania, deriving primarily from services commitments. Gains from liberalization with the EU 
region are considerably larger because of the larger amount of technology diffusion associated 
with trade and FDI with large industrialized countries, captured in our model as a relatively large 
increase in the number of varieties. In addition, when rents are captured initially, the terms of 
trade loss on partner services and the lost rents on services from the Rest of the World are larger 
when partners have low supply elasticities. We have conducted extensive sensitivity analysis to 
determine confidence intervals for the results and found that there is a set of values for key 
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Figure 1: Tanzanian Preferential Liberalization in Services with the EU: 
Part A: Partial equilibrium welfare effects in the market for EU services in Tanzania 
 

















The supply curve of the EU shifts down due to the 50% reduction in barriers 
against the EU. The demand curve for EU services also shifts down as the 
vector of prices of EU substitutes declines in equilibrium. Initial equilibrium is 
at A and moves to B. The change in consumers' surplus (∆CS), RENTS and 
welfare (∆W ) are:  ∆CS = EABF;   ∆RENTS = EACF. Then  ∆W = ABC > 0 
with initial rent capture by Tanzania. ∆W = ABC + EACF = ∆CS  > 0 with no 




The supply curve of the EU shifts down due to the 50% reduction in barriers 
against the EU. The demand curve for EU services also shifts down as the vector 
of prices of EU substitutes declines in equilibrium. Initial equilibrium is at A and 
moves to B. The change in consumers' surplus ∆CS = EABF > 0,  ∆RENTS = - 
EADG < 0, change in the Terms of Trade ∆TOT = -FCDG < 0. The change in 
welfare ∆W= ∆CS > 0 with no initial rent capture, ∆  with 










Initial equilibrium is at A and moves to B as the price of EU and other substitutes 
decrease from the vector P0
** to P1
**.  RENTS initially are HACD = t P0
AF.Q0.  = α 
+ β + δ.  RENTS at the new equilibrium are GBFE = t P1
AF.Q1. = β + γ. The 
change in RENTS = t[ P1
AF Q1 – P0
AF.Q0] < 0. If the supply curves are parallel, the 
change in rents = ‐δ.  There is a Terms of Trade gain equal to the shaded are area 
α. With no initial rent capture, the change in welfare is α > 0. If rents are captured 


















Figure 2: Tanzanian Preferential Liberalization in Services with the EU: 
Part B: Partial equilibrium welfare effects in the markets for African and Rest of the World services in Tanzania  
 
 Rest of World Market: Welfare Effects          Africa  Market:  Welfare  Effects 
 







      






Demand for rest of world services declines due to preferential 
agreement. Equilibrium for ROW moves from A to B. RENTS 
decline by ABCD. If RENTS are initially captured the change in 
welfare is –ABCD < 0.  If RENTS are not captured initially, there 


















Figure 3: Partial Equilibrium Impacts of Supply Elasticities on Welfare Changes from Preferential Liberalization of Services: 
High supply elasticities of partners increase likely gains, but excluding countries with high supply elasticities increase likely losses. 
  
















Both the less elastic (S0
I) and more elastic (S0
e ) tax ridden supply curves  
must pass through the initial equilibrium at  point A; and to be consistent 
with the estimated ad valorem barrier, the undistorted less elastic (S1
I) and 
undistorted more elastic (S1
e) supply curves
. must both pass through the 
point D. After liberalization, with a larger elasticity, the new equilibrium 
shifts to B’, and shifts to B with a lower supply elasticity. With initial rent 
capture, the difference in the welfare between the high elastic and low 
elasticity cases is: [∆
e - ∆
I] = [AB’C’- F’C’DG] – [ABC- FCDG] = 
[AB’C’ - ABC] + [FCDG - F’C’DG]. Clearly, FCDG > F’C’DG, so the 
second term is positive; but this term vanishes with no initial rent capture.  
Since the price falls to F’, the height of the triangle AB’C’ exceeds the 
height of triangle ABC. Although ambiguous, we expect Q1
e > Q1
I (see 
text). Then AB’C’>ABC and. [∆
e - ∆
I] > 0.
Case I: Welfare Gains in Market for Partner Country 
Services Increase with the Supply Elasticity 
Case II: Welfare Losses in the Market for Excluded Country 
Services Increase with the Supply Elasticity 
The initial equilibrium is at point A and moves to B’ with higher elasticity, 
and shifts to B with lower supply elasticity. With a high supply elasticity, 
the price falls by less, to G’ rather than to G. We assume that first order 
effect on quantity dominates so that Q1
e < Q1
I (see text). With initial rent 
capture, the welfare change is ∆
e = HJ’B’G’ – J’I’CA in the high 
elasticity case and is ∆
I =
 HJBG – JICA in the lesser elasticity case; the 
second terms vanish with no initial rent capture.   The difference in the 
welfare between the high elastic and low elasticity cases is [∆
e - ∆
I] = 
[HJ’B’G’ – J’I’CA] – [HJBG – JICA] = [HJ’B’G’- HJBG] + [JICA - 
J’I’CA]. The first term is the difference in the terms of trade gains and is 
negative. The second term is the lost rents and is also negative in the case 






Figure 4: Impact of Partner and Excluded Countries Supply Elasticities on Welfare Changes from Tanzanian 

















Case II: Initial rent capture by Tanzania  Case I: No initial rent capture by Tanzania60 
 
 
Figure 5:  Impact of Partner and Excluded Countries Supply Elasticities on Welfare Changes from Tanzanian 













Case II: Initial rent capture by Tanzania  Case I: No initial rent capture by Tanzania61 
 
    
     Figure 6: Sample Frequency Distribution of the Welfare Results of Tanzanian 
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Figure 7: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Frequency Distributions of 
the Output Changes by Sector        from Tanzanian Preferential Reduction of Services Barriers 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. 
The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 63 
 
Figure 8: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the 
Labor Payment Changes by Sector from Tanzanian Preferential Reduction of Services 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. 
The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 64 
 
Figure 9: Sample Frequency Distribution of the Welfare Results of Tanzanian Preferential 
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Figure 10: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. 
The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. 66 
 
Figure 11: Means, 50 and 95 Percent Confidence Intervals of the Sample Distributions of the 
Labor Payment Changes by Sector from Tanzanian Preferential Reduction of Services 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. 
The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5%  percentile. 67 
 




Banking Sorghum or millets
Professional business services Wheat
Air transport Beans
Road transport Cassava
Railway transport Other cereals
Water transport Oil seeds
Other roots & tubes
IRTS Goods Cotton
Mining & quarrying Coffee
Grain milling Tobacco
Processed food Tea
Beverages & tobacco products Cashew nuts
Textile & leather products Sisal fiber
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals Sugar
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides Fruits & vegetables
Petroleum refineries Other crops
Glass & cement Poultry & livestock
Iron steel & metal products
Other CRTS
Factors of Production Fish
Child (age 10 to 14) Hunting & forestry
Female (no formal education)  Meat & dairy products
Female (not finished primary school)  Wood paper printing
Female (not finished secondary school)  Rubber plastic & other manufacturing
Female (secondary or higher education)  Manufacture of equipment
Male (no formal education)  Utilities
Male (not finished primary school)  Construction
Male (not finished secondary school)  Wholesale & retail trade
Male (secondary or higher education)  Hotels & restaurants
Subsistence Postal communication
Agricultural capital Real estate
Capital Other services




EU: The 27 member countries of the European Union
Rest of the World: All other countries not included elsewhere
Africa: SADC (Southern African Development Community) & East African Community (EAC)
  EAC: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi
  SADC: Angola, Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
     Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe
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Table 2 -- Sectoral value-added (%, unless otherwise indicated)
Child 








































Capital Land bnTZS % of total
Business Services
Telecommunication 1.5 2.7 0.2 0.7 10.1 14.4 70.4 56.5 0.7
Insurance 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.9 3.4 0.4 2.4 12.7 8.4 68.2 4.9 0.1
Banking 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.9 3.4 0.4 2.4 12.7 8.4 68.2 88.3 1.2
Professional business services 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.9 3.4 0.4 2.4 12.7 8.4 68.2 97.7 1.3
Air transport 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.4 5.8 8.2 83.1 20.9 0.3
Road transport 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.4 5.8 8.2 83.1 136.6 1.8
Railway transport 0.8 1.5 0.1 0.4 5.8 8.2 83.1 7.0 0.1
Water transport 1.5 2.7 0.2 0.7 10.1 14.4 70.4 30.6 0.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.1 98.3 114.8 1.5
Grain milling 0.3 0.5 3.5 24.8 1.6 2.2 34.3 7.3 25.5 51.9 0.7
Processed food 0.2 0.1 0.7 4.0 0.3 0.5 4.8 3.1 16.4 69.9 151.7 2.0
Beverages & tobacco products 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.1 15.4 13.3 69.7 65.4 0.9
Textile & leather products 0.2 0.8 0.8 14.2 4.7 0.4 4.0 21.4 5.1 48.5 232.4 3.1
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 78.1 21.9 16.9 0.2
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 70.4 29.6 3.0 0.0
Petroleum refineries 24.5 2.9 72.6 13.6 0.2
Glass & cement 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 17.7 3.3 78.3 31.5 0.4




Table 2 (continued) -- Sectoral value-added  (%, unless otherwise indicated)  
Child 






































Capital Land bnTZS % of total
Agriculture
Maize 0.2 1.8 1.2 7.9 0.0 0.8 2.2 2.5 0.2 68.2 10.5 4.5 750.2 9.9
Paddy 0.2 1.9 2.1 18.7 0.1 1.1 6.3 8.4 0.7 23.1 26.3 11.2 283.5 3.7
Sorghum or millets 0.4 3.9 0.6 5.1 1.8 2.0 2.9 0.1 66.4 11.7 5.0 100.1 1.3
Wheat 47.3 5.4 33.1 14.1 17.5 0.2
Beans 3.8 2.5 20.3 0.1 1.0 4.0 3.3 0.2 30.4 24.1 10.3 178.4 2.4
Cassava 0.1 1.1 0.6 3.4 0.0 0.6 2.0 1.6 0.2 81.2 6.5 2.8 152.0 2.0
Other cereals 0.5 5.5 2.3 19.3 0.1 2.7 6.3 6.9 0.4 12.2 30.7 13.1 25.7 0.3
Oil seeds 0.6 3.3 1.6 16.9 2.3 6.6 5.0 0.2 26.9 25.9 10.8 114.1 1.5
Other roots & tube 0.8 1.6 1.3 11.9 4.2 3.6 0.2 53.2 16.2 6.9 122.7 1.6
Cotton 4.4 0.9 2.7 10.4 2.5 9.7 11.9 0.1 44.6 12.7 56.1 0.7
Coffee 1.6 0.9 11.5 1.7 6.7 11.5 0.5 6.3 49.0 10.2 76.9 1.0
Tobacco 2.3 1.8 12.0 0.2 2.7 8.4 11.3 1.8 47.5 12.0 50.5 0.7
Tea 39.2 1.2 47.8 11.7 26.2 0.3
Cashew nuts 0.8 2.5 0.5 8.3 4.4 9.8 13.7 48.2 11.9 98.2 1.3
Sisal fiber 5.4 13.7 11.1 16.7 3.1 35.0 15.0 7.1 0.1
Sugar 26.8 22.3 1.5 35.3 14.2 123.1 1.6
Fruits & vegetable 0.7 1.2 1.0 16.2 0.3 1.7 3.7 5.2 0.4 40.1 21.0 8.5 504.5 6.7
Other crops 1.1 1.0 11.8 0.1 3.5 6.9 2.8 0.2 43.7 20.7 8.2 61.4 0.8
Poultry & livestock 3.9 2.4 1.0 17.6 0.8 3.5 5.4 5.8 0.7 18.4 28.4 11.9 250.1 3.3
Other CRTS
Fish 1.9 3.2 6.5 14.9 18.6 6.0 35.6 13.3 316.5 4.2
Hunting & forestry 11.1 1.1 7.5 0.8 59.4 14.1 5.9 279.8 3.7
Meat & dairy products 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.0 87.2 11.8 176.3 2.3
Wood paper printin 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.0 15.7 3.8 77.2 72.9 1.0
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 4.1 2.1 0.3 11.0 3.8 78.7 17.7 0.2
Manufacture of equipment 0.5 0.2 2.1 2.6 3.2 91.3 48.8 0.6
Utilities 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.8 8.0 9.4 79.9 131.7 1.7
Construction 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.4 7.4 46.7 11.1 32.2 340.8 4.5
Wholesale & retail 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.5 3.0 2.2 92.2 792.2 10.5
Hotels & restauran 0.0 0.9 1.3 6.6 0.6 0.0 0.2 5.1 2.3 82.9 271.4 3.6
Postal communication 1.5 2.7 0.2 0.7 10.1 14.4 70.4 4.0 0.1
Real estate 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.7 4.2 82.4 12.0 452.1 6.0
Other services 0.1 0.1 0.5 3.9 3.4 0.4 2.4 12.7 8.4 68.2 36.1 0.5




Table 3 -- Trade Flows
bnTZS % of total % of consumption bnTZS % of total % of output __ _ _ y
IRTS Goods and Services
Business Services
Telecommunication 32.3 1.6 21.2 12.1 1.0 9.1
Insurance 2.1 0.1 26.7 3.1 0.2 35.4
Banking 36.8 1.8 26.7 55.3 4.4 35.4
Professional business services 40.7 2.0 26.7 61.2 4.8 35.4
Air transport 6.8 0.3 16.6 2.5 0.2 6.9
Road transport 44.6 2.2 16.6 16.6 1.3 6.9
Railway transport 2.3 0.1 16.6 0.8 0.1 6.9
Water transport 17.5 0.9 21.2 6.5 0.5 9.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 14.7 0.7 11.3 18.9 1.5 14.3
Grain milling 15.2 0.8 2.4 6.5 0.5 1.0
Processed food 75.7 3.8 16.3 6.8 0.5 1.6
Beverages & tobacco products 15.5 0.8 9.2 1.1 0.1 0.7
Textile & leather products 73.0 3.6 17.6 16.3 1.3 3.9
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 114.6 5.7 63.4 3.1 0.2 4.7
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 12.4 0.6 51.2 0.1 0.0 0.5
Petroleum refineries 240.3 11.9 86.4 0.1 0.0 0.4
Glass & cement 6.9 0.3 7.7 6.5 0.5 7.2
Iron steel & metal products 128.5 6.4 49.1 1.0 0.1 0.8
Agriculture
Maize 16.7 0.8 3.7 1.0 0.1 0.2
Paddy 20.5 1.0 6.5 2.4 0.2 0.7
Sorghum or millets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
Wheat 18.9 0.9 42.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
Beans 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.6
Cassava 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other cereals 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4
Oil seeds 0.3 0.0 0.3 4.0 0.3 4.2
Other roots & tubes 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cotton 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.7 2.9 35.1
Coffee 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.8 6.6 81.3
Tobacco 0.1 0.0 0.4 42.5 3.4 50.4
Tea 0.2 0.0 1.0 23.3 1.8 53.0
Cashew nuts 0.0 0.0 0.0 87.2 6.9 81.3
Sisal fiber
Sugar 49.9 2.5 27.5 12.0 0.9 7.4
Fruits & vegetables 7.6 0.4 2.2 24.3 1.9 6.9
Other crops 0.1 0.0 0.3 4.2 0.3 10.4
Poultry & livestock 3.2 0.2 1.3 6.1 0.5 2.5
Other CRTS
Fish 0.1 0.0 0.1 62.1 4.9 18.4
Hunting & forestry 0.6 0.0 0.3 5.2 0.4 3.1
Meat & dairy products 3.5 0.2 1.7 0.6 0.0 0.2
Wood paper printing 67.4 3.3 33.0 5.4 0.4 3.7
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 64.2 3.2 54.4 1.3 0.1 2.3
Manufacture of equipment 555.8 27.6 82.3 7.6 0.6 6.5
Utilities
Construction 2.4 0.1 0.3
Wholesale & retail trade
Hotels & restaurants
Postal communication 2.3 0.1 21.2 0.9 0.1 9.1
Real estate
Other services 15.0 0.7 26.7 22.6 1.8 35.4
Tourism 286.8 14.3 100.0 539.1 42.7 100.0













Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 32 39 29 32 39 29
Insurance 2 98 0 2 98 0
Banking 26 13 61 26 13 61
Professional business services 35 19 46 35 19 46
Air transport 43 14 43 43 14 43
Road transport 10 70 20 10 70 20
Railway transport 0 0 100 0 0 100
Water transport 45 27 27 45 27 27
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 10 39 50 0 12 88
Grain milling 78 8 14 0 96 3
Processed food 7 2 91 2 61 36
Beverages & tobacco products 51 36 13 5 88 7
Textile & leather products 3 7 90 13 50 37
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 29 155 6 2 78 20
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 33 155 2 0 100 0
Petroleum refineries 0 9 90 1 90 9
Glass & cement 14 13 73 22 44 34
Iron steel & metal products 10 38 52 18 47 34
Agriculture
Maize 0 75 25 0 46 54
Paddy 13 2 85 0 65 35
Sorghum or millets 0 97 3 6 41 53
Wheat 0 0 100 0 65 35
Beans 53 47 0 79 1 21
Cassava 52 27 21 77 4 18
Other cereals 98 0 2 0 100 0
Oil seeds 13 80 7 3 3 94
Other roots & tubes 21 11 68 57 2 23
Cotton 1 0 99 9 4 87
Coffee 16 30 54 73 1 25
Tobacco 41 59 0 76 2 22
Tea 65 15 20 26 63 11
Cashew nuts 0 0 100 30 11 59
Sisal fiber 0 0 100 27 3 70
Sugar 7 21 72 90 9 1
Fruits & vegetables 26 18 56 6 3 90
Other crops 12 19 69 49 1 50
Poultry & livestock 41 58 1 12 21 67
Other CRTS
Fish 11 7 82 65 8 28
Hunting & forestry 5 33 62 5 13 82
Meat & dairy products 20 50 30 0 23 76
Wood paper printing 24 34 42 2 64 34
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 16 13 71 0 90 10
Manufacture of equipment 37 11 52 18 60 22
Utilities 0 0 100 0 0 100
Construction 0 0 100 0 0 100
Wholesale & retail trade 0 0 100 0 0 100
Hotels & restaurants 0 0 100 0 0 100
Postal communication 0 0 100 0 0 100
Real estate 0 0 100 0 0 100
Other services 0 0 100 0 0 100
Tourism 0 0 100 0 0 100
Public administration health & education 0 0 100 0 0 100




Table 5 -- Benchmark Distortions (%)





Professional business services 5.5 10.9
Air transport 20.0 2.0
Road transport 30.0 5.0
Railway transport 40.0
Water transport 86.0 39.0
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 5.3 4.2
Grain milling 9.3 0.4
Processed food 8.5 7.1
Beverages & tobacco products 33.3 11.4
Textile & leather products 24.0 14.1
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 3.2 14.2
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 0.1
Petroleum refineries 2.6 1.5
Glass & cement 6.1 18.5








Other cereals 8.8 2.0
Oil seeds 5.5 0.2





Cashew nuts 22.2 6.2
Sisal fiber
Sugar 28.2 1.8
Fruits & vegetables 8.2 0.1
Other crops 5.3 12.4
Poultry & livestock 10.5 2.8
Other CRTS
Fish 24.3 2.5
Hunting & forestry 3.6
Meat & dairy products 54.3 13.0
Wood paper printing 13.1 3.0
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 5.2 7.1
Manufacture of equipment 5.3 0.0
Regulatory barriers
 
Note:  Utilities, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Postal Communication, Real Estate, Other 
Services. Public Administration and Health Care and Tourism have no distortions and are excluded from the table.   
Source: Author’s estimates. See Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) for details.  
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Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 31 22 27 20
I n s u r a n c e 5 314 60
B a n k i n g 7 76 31 4
Professional business services 63 13 7 17
A i r  t r a n s p o r t 3 03 01 03 0
R o a d  t r a n s p o r t 8 021 44
Railway transport 1 0 0 99
Water transport 45 25 15 15
Source: See Appendix  74 
 
 




telecommunications 52-high 2.5 13.4 20
banking 4-low 3.3 3.3 10
insurance 4-low 3.3 3.3 10
professional services 116-high 2.5 13.4 20
air transport** medium 1.9 10 15
road transport low 3.3 3.3 10
rail transport** medium 1.9 10 15
water transport** medium 1.9 10 15
MANUFACTURING
mining and quarrying 0-low 3.3 3.3 10
beverages and tabacco 14-low 3.3 3.3 10
grain milling*** 7-low 3.3 3.3 10
processed food 7-low 3.3 3.3 10
textiles and apparel 13-low 3.3 3.3 10
petroleum refineries 2-low 3.3 3.3 10
chemicals 34-medium 1.9 10 15
fertilizers and pesticides*** 34-medium 1.9 10 15
iron, steel and metal products 7-low 3.3 3.3 10
glass and cement 0-17-low 3.3 3.3 10
SOURCE:  R&D and sales data from National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Industrial Research and 
Development:  2005, Data Tables. Available at:  http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10319/content.cfm?pub_id=3750&id=3. 
R&D expenditures divided by 
sales (times 1000) for the US*
*Based on average R&D expenditures s for the years 2004 and 2005. The average for all US industries was 36. See table E1 for details.
***Food is the proxy for grain mlling; chemicals is the proxy for fertilizers and pesticides; primary and fabricated metals are the proxies for iron, 
steel and metal products; for glass and cement we use an average of  plastics, rubber, mineral and wood products.
**We evaluate transportation as a medium R&D sector since three sectrors dominate R&D expenditures of US multinationals operating abroad. 
These are transportation, chemiicals and computers and electronics. Moreover, about two-thirds of all R&D expenditures of foreign 
multinationals operatingi in the US was performed in the same three sectors. See "U.S. and International Research and Development: Funds and 





Table 7: Summary of Results, no intial rent capture case (results are percentage change from initial equilibrium, unless otherwise indicated)
Scenario definition Benchmark EU FTA
EU 
Discriminatory 












50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firm No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No No No No No No Yes
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.35 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.44 1.71 0.72 0.96 6.98
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.32 0.27 0.04 0.09 0.40 1.55 0.65 0.86 6.31
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3
Tariff revenue -24.9 0.7 -25.4 0.2 -24.7 -100.0 1.5 -100.0 -100.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 2.5 0.0 2.5 0.3
Aggregate exports  6.3 0.5 5.8 0.8 7.2 44.9 1.9 41.8 77.5
Factor Earnings
Subsistence Factor   0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.5 2.7 0.9 1.7 8.8
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.9 3.9 0.8 3.1 8.6
Female labor (no formal education)   0.8 0.3 0.6 0.1 1.0 5.6 0.7 4.8 10.7
Female labor (not finished primary school)   -0.4 0.3 -0.7 0.1 -0.3 -6.9 0.6 -7.4 -5.8
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.8 3.3 0.8 2.5 8.1
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.8 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.8 1.8 0.5 1.3 3.6
Male labor (no formal education)   1.0 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.1 6.8 0.6 6.1 11.0
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.8 3.1 0.6 2.5 6.0
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.9 3.2 0.7 2.5 6.7
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.8 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.8 3.2 0.6 2.5 6.2
Capital 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.1 1.0 5.3 0.7 4.5 9.6
Agricultural land 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.8 4.7 0.6 4.1 8.6
Factor adjustments
Subsistence Factor   0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.8
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 2.0 0.1 2.1 2.3
Female labor (no formal education)   0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 3.1 0.2 3.2 2.9
Female labor (not finished primary school)   0.7 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.8 7.3 0.2 7.0 10.2
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 2.5 0.2 2.5 3.3
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.8 0.3 1.8 2.8
Male labor (no formal education)   0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.4 3.3 0.2 3.5 3.1
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 4.3 0.3 4.3 5.4
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 2.9 0.3 2.8 4.2
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.3 1.2 3.4
Capital 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 3.3 0.3 3.2 5.0
Agricultural land 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.4 3.5 0.2 3.6 3.3




Table 8: Summary of Results, Initial Rent Capture Case  (results are percentage change from initial equilibrium, unless otherwise indicated)
Scenario definition Benchmark EU FTA
EU 
Discriminatory 












50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firm No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms No No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms No No No No No No No No No Yes
Removal of tariffs on EU sourced goods No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Removal of tariffs on ROW sourced goods No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.27 0.22 0.05 0.03 0.29 1.48 0.49 0.96 5.37
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.24 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.27 1.34 0.44 0.86 4.85
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3
Tariff revenue -24.9 0.6 -25.4 0.2 -24.8 -100.0 1.4 -100.0 -100.0
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 2.5 0.1 2.5 0.5
Aggregate exports  6.4 0.5 5.8 0.9 7.2 44.9 2.0 41.8 76.1
Factor Earnings
Subsistence Factor   0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.4 0.6 1.7 7.0
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.7 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.8 3.7 0.6 3.1 7.2
Female labor (no formal education)   0.8 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.9 5.4 0.5 4.8 9.2
Female labor (not finished primary school)   -0.4 0.2 -0.7 0.0 -0.4 -7.0 0.5 -7.4 -6.4
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.6 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.7 3.2 0.6 2.5 7.2
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.9 2.1 0.8 1.3 5.5
Male labor (no formal education)   0.9 0.2 0.7 0.1 1.0 6.7 0.5 6.1 9.9
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.7 3.1 0.5 2.5 5.4
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.8 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.9 3.3 0.8 2.5 7.4
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.9 0.4 0.4 0.1 1.0 3.5 1.0 2.5 8.5
Capital 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.1 1.0 5.4 0.8 4.5 10.4
Agricultural land 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.7 4.5 0.4 4.1 7.1
Factor adjustments
Subsistence Factor   0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.9
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 2.0 0.1 2.1 2.3
Female labor (no formal education)   0.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.4 3.1 0.2 3.2 3.1
Female labor (not finished primary school)   0.7 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.7 7.3 0.2 7.0 10.1
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.3 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 2.5 0.2 2.5 3.3
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.8 0.4 1.8 3.4
Male labor (no formal education)   0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 3.4 0.2 3.5 3.2
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 4.3 0.2 4.3 5.3
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 3.0 0.3 2.8 4.5
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.5 0.5 1.2 4.3
Capital 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.6 3.4 0.4 3.2 5.6
Agricultural land 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 3.5 0.2 3.6 3.3
Source: Authors' estimates.77 
 
 
Table 9: Output and Employment Impacts from Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
Unilateral Liberalization EU-Africa FTA African FTA EU FTA
Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income
Business Services
Telecommunication 5.4 5.7 2.4 1.5 0.0 -0.3 2.4 1.8
Insurance 5.3 6.9 3.4 3.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
Banking 5.9 7.4 2.0 1.8 0.4 0.2 1.7 1.6
Professional business services 5.7 7.3 2.6 2.3 0.3 0.1 2.4 2.2
Air transport 24.4 26.4 5.1 4.7 0.6 0.5 4.5 4.2
Road transport 22.1 24.0 4.6 4.2 0.6 0.5 4.0 3.8
Railway transport 26.0 28.0 5.4 5.0 0.7 0.6 4.7 4.4
Water transport 10.5 10.9 6.1 5.2 -1.1 -1.4 7.2 6.5
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying -3.7 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6
Grain milling 0.1 2.9 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.3
Processed food -2.1 1.0 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0
Beverages & tobacco products -2.6 -0.2 -2.1 -2.0 0.1 0.0 -2.2 -2.1
Textile & leather products -24.3 -22.0 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.3
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals -0.4 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 2.8 6.2 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.6 1.3
Petroleum refineries -6.6 -4.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4
Glass & cement -2.7 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2
Iron steel & metal products -9.1 -6.0 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.3
Agriculture
Maize -0.2 2.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.4
Paddy -6.0 -2.9 -1.1 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -1.1 -0.6
Sorghum or millets 0.5 3.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3
Wheat -12.8 -9.6 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.1
Beans -0.1 3.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6
Cassava -0.2 2.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5
Other cereals -0.2 3.7 -0.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.3
Oil seeds -0.7 3.0 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7
Other roots & tubes 0.1 3.3 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6
Cotton -10.2 -7.4 1.6 1.9 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.7
Coffee 35.6 41.1 4.0 4.7 -0.2 -0.1 4.2 4.8
Tobacco 21.8 25.0 2.9 3.0 0.6 0.6 2.3 2.4
Tea 10.9 15.0 1.5 2.1 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.9
Cashew nuts 50.6 57.3 6.0 6.9 0.1 0.2 5.9 6.7
Sisal fiber -24.3 -21.2 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.3
Sugar -23.5 -22.7 -2.5 -2.2 -0.1 0.0 -2.4 -2.1
Fruits & vegetables -0.3 3.2 -0.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.5
Other crops 2.5 6.2 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.0
Poultry & livestock 0.4 4.2 -0.2 0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.4
Other CRTS
Fish 2.1 6.5 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9
Hunting & forestry -1.0 1.9 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.3 0.2
Meat & dairy products -2.8 0.0 -0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.4
Wood paper printing -12.8 -9.1 -4.5 -3.9 0.0 0.0 -4.5 -3.9
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing -8.3 -5.1 -1.5 -1.1 0.0 0.0 -1.5 -1.1
Manufacture of equipment -10.5 -6.5 -5.1 -4.4 -0.1 -0.1 -5.0 -4.4
Utilities -4.6 -1.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.3
Construction 0.1 3.3 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6
Wholesale & retail trade 0.6 4.1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.7
Hotels & restaurants 14.7 19.2 2.9 3.4 0.4 0.4 2.5 3.0
Postal communication 2.0 3.5 1.3 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.9
Real estate 1.4 3.5 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.7
Other services 1.5 4.0 1.5 1.5 0.2 0.1 1.3 1.5
Tourism 95.9 16.1 2.3 13.8
Public administration health & education 0.8 2.9 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6
Source: Authors' estimates.  78 
 
 
         
Table 10: Impacts on Imports from Unilateral Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -3.5 -5.1 -3.1
Insurance -9.5 -9.5
Banking -5.8 -5.8 -3.6
Professional business services -2.5 -4.0 -2.2
Air transport 13.4 8.6 15.0
Road transport 14.8 14.8 17.0
Railway transport 12.7
Water transport -18.7 -24.6 -16.5
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 23.5 6.6 72.0
Grain milling 43.9 6.0 89.8
Processed food 18.6 -11.3 77.4
Beverages & tobacco products 128.9 16.9 176.1
Textile & leather products 43.2 -9.6 306.9
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 7.6 -1.4 8.8
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 11.6 4.3 13.3
Petroleum refineries -5.1 -5.1 7.2
Glass & cement 25.3 1.3 79.0
Iron steel & metal products 10.4 -13.1 33.3
Agriculture
Maize 4.8 1.5 4.8
Paddy 90.7 -10.6 90.7
Sorghum or millets -1.9 -1.9
Wheat 16.9 16.9
Beans 359.1 -3.7
Cassava 200.7 -7.7 200.7
Other cereals 41.6 41.6
Oil seeds 28.2 3.3 28.2
Other roots & tubes 5.7 3.3 5.7
Cotton -7.8 -7.8
Coffee 312.6 122.0 312.6
Tobacco 201.2 16.1 201.2
Tea 152.8 13.2 152.8
Cashew nuts 460.3
Sisal fiber
Sugar 75.0 -35.2 75.0
Fruits & vegetables 38.5 1.1 38.5
Other crops 32.9 8.0 32.9
Poultry & livestock 55.8 4.6 55.8
Other CRTS
Fish 154.7 6.6 154.7
Hunting & forestry 0.5 0.5 0.5
Meat & dairy products 447.1 -3.4 447.1
Wood paper printing 45.1 -11.4 45.1
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 10.4 -9.8 10.4
Manufacture of equipment 5.6 -14.1 5.6
Utilities
Construction -1.4






Public administration health & education -0.9
Source: Authors' estimates.  79 
 
 
Table 11: Impacts on Exports from Unilateral Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)
no intial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 2.2 2.2 2.2
Insurance -1.5 -1.5
Banking 0.0 0.0 0.0
Professional business services 1.2 1.2 1.2
Air transport 0.6 0.6 0.6
Road transport 8.0 8.0 8.0
Railway transport 0.9
Water transport -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying -5.2 -5.2 -5.2
Grain milling 1.5 1.5 1.5
Processed food 44.2 44.2 44.2
Beverages & tobacco products -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Textile & leather products -8.5 -8.5 -8.5
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 3.1 3.1 3.1
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides -0.1 -0.1
Petroleum refineries -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Glass & cement 0.4 0.4 0.4




Sorghum or millets 2.4 2.4 2.4
Wheat -11.6 -11.6 -11.6
Beans -4.1 -4.1 -4.1
Cassava -2.4 -2.4 -2.4
Other cereals -3.7
Oil seeds -5.5 -5.5 -5.5
Other roots & tubes
Cotton -9.7 -9.7 -9.7
Coffee 27.7 27.7 27.7
Tobacco 21.1 21.1 21.1
Tea 7.3 7.3 7.3
Cashew nuts 40.5 40.5 40.5
Sisal fiber
Sugar -15.1 -15.1 -15.1
Fruits & vegetables -4.5 -4.5 -4.5
Other crops -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Poultry & livestock -4.3 -4.3 -4.3
Other CRTS
Fish -3.8 -3.8 -3.8
Hunting & forestry -3.5 -3.5 -3.5
Meat & dairy products -5.3 -5.3 -5.3
Wood paper printing -14.9 -14.9 -14.9
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing -7.3 -7.3 -7.3
Manufacture of equipment -7.6 -7.6 -7.6
Utilities
Construction






Public administration health & education 2.4
Source: Authors' estimates.  80 
 
Table 12: Impacts on Number of Firms from Unilateral Liberalisation (% change from benchmark)




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -1.6 16.0 5.1 18.9
Insurance -5.5 47.5 47.2
Banking -2.8 32.8 32.8 88.0
Professional business services -0.7 29.5 8.9 35.0
Air transport 5.0 28.0 7.6 34.6
Road transport 14.3 22.9 22.9 57.1
Railway transport 1.4 21.7
Water transport -16.1 72.7 15.3 94.9
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying -2.2 15.0 2.5 49.5
Grain milling 0.1 23.7 -1.9 56.1
Processed food -1.9 7.3 -15.3 47.1
Beverages & tobacco products -2.2 62.5 -2.8 98.1
Textile & leather products -21.9 13.7 -21.3 167.8
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals -0.4 3.6 -3.0 4.4
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 2.7 8.7 3.3 10.0
Petroleum refineries -5.5 -6.9 -5.8 3.5
Glass & cement -2.3 14.2 -3.0 51.6
Iron steel & metal products -8.1 4.6 -12.7 20.9
Source: Authors' estimates.  81 
 
 
Table 13: Impacts on Imports from EU-Africa FTA (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -0.9 -3.0 -4.4
Insurance -10.6 -10.6
Banking 0.0 0.0 -1.3
Professional business services 0.1 -1.7 -2.4
Air transport 2.6 1.1 1.7
Road transport 2.3 2.3 2.2
Railway transport 2.2
Water transport -9.1 -18.1 -22.7
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 21.7 4.5 6.3
Grain milling 46.9 8.6 8.6
Processed food 42.8 7.4 5.9
Beverages & tobacco products 131.1 18.2 16.3
Textile & leather products 88.9 22.7 23.4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 15.8 1.5 -0.8
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 2.6 1.0 3.0
Petroleum refineries 3.9 2.6 2.9
Glass & cement 30.0 5.1 4.7
Iron steel & metal products 30.7 2.8 0.6
Agriculture
Maize 4.0 0.7 0.7
Paddy 110.7 -1.2 -1.2
Sorghum or millets 0.2 0.2
Wheat 40.1 0.3
Beans 349.8 -5.7
Cassava 207.0 -5.8 -5.8
Other cereals 39.1 -0.7
Oil seeds 25.8 1.4 1.4
Other roots & tubes 3.8 1.5 1.5
Cotton 6.8 1.8
Coffee 125.3 21.2 21.2
Tobacco 149.3 -3.9 -3.9
Tea 118.3 -2.2 -2.2
Cashew nuts 28.3
Sisal fiber
Sugar 161.1 -3.4 -3.4
Fruits & vegetables 37.8 0.6 0.6
Other crops 25.9 2.3 2.3
Poultry & livestock 49.8 0.6 0.6
Other CRTS
Fish 144.7 2.4 2.4
Hunting & forestry 0.4 0.4 0.4
Meat & dairy products 458.4 -1.4 -1.4
Wood paper printing 56.2 -4.7 -4.7
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 20.2 -1.8 -1.8
Manufacture of equipment 14.9 -6.4 -6.4
Utilities
Construction 0.1






Public administration health & education 0.1
Source: Authors' estimates.  82 
 
 
Table 14: Impacts on Exports from EU-Africa FTA (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 1.2 1.2 1.2
Insurance -2.8 -2.8
Banking 0.9 0.9 0.9
Professional business services 0.8 0.8 0.8
Air transport 0.9 0.9 0.9
Road transport 2.4 2.4 2.4
Railway transport 0.9
Water transport -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Grain milling -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Processed food 2.1 2.1 2.1
Beverages & tobacco products -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Textile & leather products -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 1.1 1.1 1.1
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides -0.1 -0.1
Petroleum refineries 0.1 0.1 0.1
Glass & cement 0.1 0.1 0.1




Sorghum or millets -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Wheat -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Beans -1.5 -1.5 -1.5
Cassava -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Other cereals -1.8
Oil seeds -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Other roots & tubes
Cotton 1.4 1.4 1.4
Coffee 2.2 2.2 2.2
Tobacco 3.4 3.4 3.4
Tea 0.9 0.9 0.9
Cashew nuts 3.8 3.8 3.8
Sisal fiber
Sugar -2.1 -2.1 -2.1
Fruits & vegetables -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Other crops -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
Poultry & livestock -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Other CRTS
Fish -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Hunting & forestry -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Meat & dairy products -1.6 -1.6 -1.6
Wood paper printing -4.7 -4.7 -4.7
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Manufacture of equipment -4.1 -4.1 -4.1
Utilities
Construction






Public administration health & education 0.3
Source: Authors' estimates.  83 
 
Table 15: Impacts on Number of Firms from EU-Africa FTA (% change from benchmark)




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -1.1 19.8 6.1 -6.5
Insurance -6.8 44.9 44.6
Banking 0.2 40.9 40.9 -1.1
Professional business services -0.2 35.9 10.6 -3.9
Air transport 1.1 9.0 2.7 4.3
Road transport 2.8 9.5 9.5 5.8
Railway transport 0.8 4.5
Water transport -11.6 106.9 19.7 -37.4
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 0.0 13.7 1.0 2.3
Grain milling -0.2 25.6 0.0 0.0
Processed food 0.5 24.0 -0.7 -1.7
Beverages & tobacco products -1.7 63.7 -2.0 -3.3
Textile & leather products -0.2 42.0 0.3 0.7
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 0.0 9.6 -0.9 -2.6
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 0.6 2.0 0.8 2.2
Petroleum refineries 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.4
Glass & cement -0.1 17.5 -0.2 -0.4
Iron steel & metal products -0.6 19.1 -0.9 -2.5
Source: Authors' estimates.  84 
 
 
Table 16: Impacts on Imports from African FTA (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -1.2 -0.3 -1.3
Insurance -14.4 -10.9
Banking -0.5 0.8 -0.6
Professional business services -0.3 0.3 -0.3
Air transport 0.3 0.4 0.3
Road transport -0.2 0.1 -0.2
Railway transport 0.3
Water transport -2.7 -1.0 -2.8
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 3.5 3.5 3.9
Grain milling 9.0 9.0 9.4
Processed food 8.6 8.5 9.1
Beverages & tobacco products 21.5 21.5 21.7
Textile & leather products 22.5 22.5 22.9
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 2.9 2.8 2.9
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 0.3 0.1 0.3
Petroleum refineries 2.4 2.5 2.6
Glass & cement 5.4 5.4 5.6
Iron steel & metal products 4.2 4.2 4.3
Agriculture
Maize 0.5 0.5 0.5
Paddy 0.4 0.4 0.4
Sorghum or millets 0.4 0.4
Wheat 0.2 0.2
Beans 0.5 0.5
Cassava 0.6 0.6 0.6
Other cereals 0.4 0.4
Oil seeds 0.5 0.5 0.5
Other roots & tubes 0.6 0.6 0.6
Cotton 0.5 0.5
Coffee 3.8 3.8 3.8
Tobacco 0.7 0.7 0.7
Tea 0.9 0.9 0.9
Cashew nuts 4.7
Sisal fiber
Sugar 0.3 0.3 0.3
Fruits & vegetables 0.6 0.6 0.6
Other crops 0.7 0.7 0.7
Poultry & livestock 0.5 0.5 0.5
Other CRTS
Fish 0.7 0.7 0.7
Hunting & forestry 0.5 0.5 0.5
Meat & dairy products 0.5 0.5 0.5
Wood paper printing 0.3 0.3 0.3
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 0.1 0.1 0.1
Manufacture of equipment 0.1 0.1 0.1
Utilities
Construction 0.2






Public administration health & education 0.0
Source: Authors' estimates.  85 
 
 
Table 17: Impacts on Exports from African FTA (% change from benchmark)
No intial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 0.1 0.1 0.1
Insurance -4.1 -4.1
Banking 0.0 0.0 0.0
Professional business services 0.1 0.1 0.1
Air transport 0.1 0.1 0.1
Road transport 0.1 0.1 0.1
Railway transport 0.1
Water transport 0.3 0.3 0.3
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Grain milling -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Processed food -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Beverages & tobacco products 0.0 0.0 0.0
Textile & leather products -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 0.1 0.1 0.1
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides -0.1 -0.1
Petroleum refineries 0.0 0.0 0.0
Glass & cement -0.1 -0.1 -0.1




Sorghum or millets -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Wheat -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Beans -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Cassava -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Other cereals -0.4
Oil seeds -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Other roots & tubes
Cotton 0.1 0.1 0.1
Coffee -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
Tobacco 0.6 0.6 0.6
Tea -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Cashew nuts -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Sisal fiber
Sugar -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Fruits & vegetables -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Other crops -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Poultry & livestock -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Other CRTS
Fish -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Hunting & forestry -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Meat & dairy products -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Wood paper printing -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Manufacture of equipment -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Utilities
Construction






Public administration health & education 0.0
Source: Authors' estimates.  86 
 
 
Table 18: Impacts on Number of Firms from African FTA (% change from benchmark)




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -0.5 -1.9 7.5 -2.2
Insurance -7.9 -13.6 43.2
Banking -0.2 -0.4 41.1 -0.8
Professional business services 0.0 -0.4 11.7 -0.5
Air transport 0.2 0.6 1.8 0.7
Road transport -0.1 -0.1 6.4 -0.2
Railway transport 0.1 0.6
Water transport -1.1 -4.4 29.8 -5.2
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5
Grain milling 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6
P r o c e s s e d  f o o d 0 . 00 . 20 . 20 . 6
Beverages & tobacco products 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Textile & leather products 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
Petroleum refineries 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Glass & cement 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Iron steel & metal products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Source: Authors' estimates.  87 
 
 
Table 19: Impacts on Imports from EU FTA (% change from benchmark)
No initial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 0.3 -2.7 -3.2
Insurance 4.9 0.3
Banking 0.5 -0.8 -0.8
Professional business services 0.4 -2.0 -2.1
Air transport 2.4 0.8 1.4
Road transport 2.5 2.2 2.4
Railway transport 1.9
Water transport -6.6 -18.2 -20.9
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 21.3 4.2 5.6
Grain milling 46.4 8.2 7.9
Processed food 42.4 7.2 5.1
Beverages & tobacco products 130.7 17.9 15.9
Textile & leather products 88.6 22.5 22.8
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 15.6 1.5 -1.0
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 2.4 0.9 2.7
Petroleum refineries 3.9 2.5 2.7
Glass & cement 29.8 4.9 4.4
Iron steel & metal products 30.7 2.8 0.4
Agriculture
Maize 3.5 0.2 0.2
Paddy 109.9 -1.6 -1.6
Sorghum or millets -0.2 -0.2
Wheat 39.8 0.1
Beans 347.5 -6.2
Cassava 205.3 -6.3 -6.3
Other cereals 38.5 -1.2
Oil seeds 25.2 0.9 0.9
Other roots & tubes 3.2 0.9 0.9
Cotton 6.3 1.3
Coffee 117.6 17.1 17.1
Tobacco 147.5 -4.6 -4.6
Tea 116.4 -3.1 -3.1
Cashew nuts 23.1
Sisal fiber
Sugar 160.4 -3.7 -3.7
Fruits & vegetables 37.0 0.0 0.0
Other crops 25.1 1.6 1.6
Poultry & livestock 49.0 0.1 0.1
Other CRTS
Fish 143.0 1.7 1.7
Hunting & forestry 0.0 0.0 0.0
Meat & dairy products 455.8 -1.9 -1.9
Wood paper printing 55.9 -4.9 -4.9
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 20.0 -2.0 -2.0
Manufacture of equipment 14.9 -6.5 -6.5
Utilities
Construction -0.1






Public administration health & education 0.1
Source: Authors' estimates.  88 
 
 
Table 20: Impacts on Exports from EU FTA (% change from benchmark)
No intial rent capture case
European 
Union Africa
Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication 1.1 1.1 1.1
Insurance 1.2 1.2
Banking 0.9 0.9 0.9
Professional business services 0.7 0.7 0.7
Air transport 0.8 0.8 0.8
Road transport 2.3 2.3 2.3
Railway transport 0.8
Water transport -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying -0.7 -0.7 -0.7
Grain milling -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Processed food 2.7 2.7 2.7
Beverages & tobacco products -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Textile & leather products -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 1.1 1.1 1.1
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 0.0 0.0
Petroleum refineries 0.1 0.1 0.1
Glass & cement 0.2 0.2 0.2




Sorghum or millets 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wheat -1.3 -1.3 -1.3
Beans -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
Cassava -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Other cereals -1.4
Oil seeds -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Other roots & tubes
Cotton 1.3 1.3 1.3
Coffee 2.8 2.8 2.8
Tobacco 2.8 2.8 2.8
Tea 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cashew nuts 4.2 4.2 4.2
Sisal fiber
Sugar -1.7 -1.7 -1.7
Fruits & vegetables -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Other crops -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Poultry & livestock -1.3 -1.3 -1.3
Other CRTS
Fish -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
Hunting & forestry -0.8 -0.8 -0.8
Meat & dairy products -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
Wood paper printing -4.5 -4.5 -4.5
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Manufacture of equipment -3.8 -3.8 -3.8
Utilities
Construction






Public administration health & education 0.3
Source: Authors' estimates.  89 
 
 
Table 21: Impacts on Number of Firms from EU FTA (% change from benchmark)




Rest of the 
World
Business Services
Telecommunication -0.7 22.1 -1.4 -4.5
Insurance 1.1 71.9 0.9
Banking 0.4 41.5 -0.1 -0.3
Professional business services -0.2 36.5 -1.1 -3.5
Air transport 0.9 8.4 0.9 3.6
Road transport 2.9 9.6 2.9 6.0
Railway transport 0.7 3.9
Water transport -10.5 116.4 -12.9 -35.0
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 0.0 13.4 0.8 1.7
Grain milling -0.2 25.3 -0.3 -0.5
Processed food 0.5 23.7 -0.8 -2.2
Beverages & tobacco products -1.8 63.5 -2.2 -3.5
Textile & leather products -0.2 41.8 0.1 0.3
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals -0.1 9.5 -0.9 -2.7
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 0.6 1.8 0.7 2.0
Petroleum refineries 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.2
Glass & cement -0.1 17.4 -0.3 -0.6
Iron steel & metal products -0.6 19.1 -1.0 -2.6
Source: Authors' estimates.  90 
 
Table 22: Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis of Tanzania-EU FTA
Parameter Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
σ(qi, qj) –  services sectors 1.5 3 4.5 2.11 0.35 0.27
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors See below 0.45 0.35 0.32
σ(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.27 0.35 0.45
σ(D, M) 2 4 6 0.31 0.35 0.40
σ(L, K) 0 . 5 1 1 . 50 . 3 40 . 3 50 . 3 6
σ(A1,…An) NA 0 0.25 NA 0.35 0.36
σ(D, E) 2 4 6 0.33 0.35 0.37
εTZA 0.34 0.35 0.36
εEU 0.19 0.35 0.45
εAFR 0.35 0.35 0.35
εROW 0.36 0.35 0.35
θr  NA 0 1 NA 0.35 0.27
θr  - CRTS model NA 0 1 NA 0.04 -0.03
θm  0.025 0.05 0.075 0.35 0.35 0.35
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors
Processed food 4.8 9.6 14.4
Beverages & tobacco products 1.5 2.3 3.1
Textile & leather products 2.8 3.6 4.4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 1.7 2.5 3.3
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 1.6 2.4 3.2
Petroleum refineries 2.8 3.6 4.4
Glass & cement 2.3 4.6 6.9
Iron steel & metal products 3.7 7.3 11
Mining & quarrying 2.8 3.6 4.4
Grain milling 2.4 3.2 4
Key:
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Parameter value % Welfare Change (EV) 
σ(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
σ(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
σ(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties
σ(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
Central values of all 4 sets of  ε
parameters are listed in table 6B.
Lower and upper values are 0.5
and 1.5 times central values.
εAFR: Elasticity of AFR service firm supply with respect to price of output
εROW: Elasticity of Rest of World service firm supply with respect to price of output
θr:  Share of rents in services sectors captured by domestic agents
θm: Shares of value added in multinational firms due to specialized primary factor imports 
σ(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods
σ(D, E): Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
εTZA: Elasticity of national service firm supply with respect to price of output







Table 23: Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis of Tanzania-Africa FTA
Parameter Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
σ(qi, qj) –  services sectors 1.5 3 4.5 1.00 0.10 0.06
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors See below 0.11 0.10 0.09
σ(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.08 0.10 0.12
σ(D, M) 2 4 6 0.10 0.10 0.10
σ(L, K) 0 . 5 1 1 . 50 . 1 00 . 1 00 . 1 0
σ(A1,…An) NA 0 0.25 NA 0.10 0.10
σ(D, E) 2 4 6 0.09 0.10 0.10
εTZA 0.10 0.10 0.10
εEU 0.10 0.10 0.10
εAFR 0.05 0.10 0.14
εROW 0.10 0.10 0.10
θr  NA 0 1 NA 0.10 0.03
θr  - CRTS model NA 0 1 NA 0.05 -0.02
θm  0.025 0.05 0.075 0.10 0.10 0.10
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors
Processed food 4.8 9.6 14.4
Beverages & tobacco products 1.5 2.3 3.1
Textile & leather products 2.8 3.6 4.4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 1.7 2.5 3.3
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 1.6 2.4 3.2
Petroleum refineries 2.8 3.6 4.4
Glass & cement 2.3 4.6 6.9
Iron steel & metal products 3.7 7.3 11
Mining & quarrying 2.8 3.6 4.4
Grain milling 2.4 3.2 4
Key:
Source: Authors’ estimates.
θr:  Share of rents in services sectors captured by domestic agents
θm: Shares of value added in multinational firms due to specialized primary factor imports 
σ(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods
σ(D, E): Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
εTZA: Elasticity of national service firm supply with respect to price of output
εEU: Elasticity of EU service firm supply with respect to price of output
εAFR: Elasticity of AFR service firm supply with respect to price of output
εROW: Elasticity of Rest of World service firm supply with respect to price of output
Lower and upper values are 0.5
and 1.5 times central values.
σ(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
σ(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
σ(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties
σ(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
Parameter value % Change in Welfare (EV)
Central values of all 4 sets of  ε








Table 24: Summary of Results of Professional Services Policies --No initial rent capture case
















EU & Africa 
Discriminatory 
Services
Rest of World 
Discriminatory 
Services
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firm Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms Yes No Yes No No No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms Yes Yes No No No No No
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.24 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.22 0.12 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Tariff revenue 0.36 0.12 0.21 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.13
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Aggregate exports  -0.13 -0.23 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03
Factor Earnings
Subsistence Factor   0.24 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.16 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06
Female labor (no formal education)   0.13 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Female labor (not finished primary school)   0.19 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.20 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.28 0.16 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.08
Male labor (no formal education)   0.08 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.12 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.24 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.08
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.29 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.08
Capital 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06
Agricultural land 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04
Factor adjustments
Subsistence Factor   0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Female labor (no formal education)   0.12 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02
Female labor (not finished primary school)   0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.15 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04
Male labor (no formal education)   0.16 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.13 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.13 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.14 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04
Capital 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04
Agricultural land 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Source: Authors' estimates.93 
 
Table 25: Summary of Results of Professional Services Policies --Initial Rent Capture Case
















EU & Africa 
Discriminatory 
Services
Rest of World 
Discriminatory 
Services
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on EU services firms Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on African services firm Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
50% reduction of discriminatory barriers on ROW services firms Yes No Yes No No No Yes
50% reduction of regulatory barriers for all services firms Yes Yes No No No No No
Aggregate welfare
Welfare (EV as % of consumption) 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05
Welfare (EV as % of GDP) 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05
Government budget
Tariff revenue (% of GDP) 1.26 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Tariff revenue 0.32 0.11 0.19 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.12
Aggregate trade
Real exchange rate 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Aggregate exports  -0.13 -0.23 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03
Factor Earnings
Subsistence Factor   0.20 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.13 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Female labor (no formal education)   0.09 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04
Female labor (not finished primary school)   0.17 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.05
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.18 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.33 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.09
Male labor (no formal education)   0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.11 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.27 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.08
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.33 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.09
Capital 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07
Agricultural land 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Factor adjustments
Subsistence Factor   0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Child labor (age 10 to 14)   0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Female labor (no formal education)   0.12 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Female labor (not finished primary school)   0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
Female labor (not finished secondary school)   0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
Female labor (secondary or higher education)   0.18 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Male labor (no formal education)   0.15 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Male labor (not finished primary school)   0.13 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Male labor (not finished secondary school)   0.16 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04
Male labor (secondary or higher education)   0.17 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05
Capital 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04
Agricultural land 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
Source: Authors' estimates.  94 
 
 
Table 26: Impacts on Number of Professional Services Firms from Liberalisation Barriers in Professional Services 


















Rest of World 
Discriminatory 
Services
Tanzania 3.0 5.2 -2.2 -0.9 -0.1 -1.0 -1.3
European Union 32.1 7.0 22.9 33.5 -0.8 32.3 -7.1
Africa 9.6 2.4 7.1 -1.7 11.6 9.6 -2.6
Rest of the World 38.2 8.2 27.0 -5.6 -1.0 -6.4 35.3
Source: Authors' estimates.  95 
 
 
Table 27: Output and Employment Impacts from Preferential Reduction in Barriers in Professional Services 
No initial rent capture case (% change from benchmark)
Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income Output Labor income
Business Services
Telecommunication 0.52 0.07 0.24 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.21 0.03
Insurance 0.69 0.39 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.28 0.16
Banking 0.71 0.41 0.33 0.19 0.04 0.02 0.29 0.16
Professional business services 2.61 2.30 1.12 0.98 0.04 0.02 1.09 0.97
Air transport 0.47 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.19 0.07
Road transport 0.46 0.16 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.18 0.06
Railway transport 0.51 0.21 0.24 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.20 0.08
Water transport 0.48 0.04 0.22 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.19 0.02
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Mining & quarrying 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05
Grain milling 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03
Processed food 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
Beverages & tobacco products 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03
Textile & leather products 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Petroleum refineries 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
Glass & cement 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03
Iron steel & metal products 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02
Agriculture
Maize 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Paddy 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04
Sorghum or millets 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Wheat -0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.03
Beans 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Cassava 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Other cereals 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
Oil seeds 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Other roots & tubes 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Cotton 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
Coffee -0.59 -0.49 -0.26 -0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.24 -0.21
Tobacco 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06
Tea 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Cashew nuts -0.76 -0.66 -0.33 -0.28 -0.02 -0.01 -0.32 -0.28
Sisal fiber 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05
Sugar -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02
Fruits & vegetables 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Other crops 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Poultry & livestock 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Other CRTS
Fish -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
Hunting & forestry 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Meat & dairy products 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
Wood paper printing 0.19 0.23 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09
Rubber plastic & other manufacturing 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05
Manufacture of equipment 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Utilities 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06
Construction 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05
Wholesale & retail trade 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Hotels & restaurants 0.22 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09
Postal communication 0.41 0.11 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.17 0.04
Real estate 0.23 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02
Other services 0.77 0.58 0.35 0.26 0.05 0.03 0.31 0.23
Tourism 0.42 0.23 0.07 0.16












Table 28: Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis for Preferential Liberalization between 
Tanzania and the Africa Region in Professional Services
Parameter Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
σ(qi, qj) –  services sectors 1.5 3 4.5 0.113 0.007 0.004
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors See below 0.008 0.007 0.007
σ(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.006 0.007 0.009
σ(D, M) 2 4 6 0.007 0.007 0.007
σ(L, K) 0.5 1 1.5 0.007 0.007 0.007
σ(A1,…An) NA 0 0.25 NA 0.007 0.007
σ(D, E) 2 4 6 0.007 0.007 0.007
εTZA 0.007 0.007 0.007
εEU 0.007 0.007 0.007
εAFR 0.004 0.007 0.010
εROW 0.007 0.007 0.007
θr  NA 0 1 NA 0.007 0.002
θr  - CRTS model NA 0 1 NA 0.003 -0.001
θm  0.025 0.05 0.075 0.007 0.007 0.007
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors
Processed food 4.8 9.6 14.4
Beverages & tobacco products 1.5 2.3 3.1
Textile & leather products 2.8 3.6 4.4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 1.7 2.5 3.3
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 1.6 2.4 3.2
Petroleum refineries 2.8 3.6 4.4
Glass & cement 2.3 4.6 6.9
Iron steel & metal products 3.7 7.3 11
Mining & quarrying 2.8 3.6 4.4
Grain milling 2.4 3.2 4
Key:
Source: Authors’ estimates.
θr:  Share of rents in services sectors captured by domestic agents
θm: Shares of value added in multinational firms due to specialized primary factor imports 
σ(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods
σ(D, E): Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
εTZA: Elasticity of national service firm supply with respect to price of output
εEU: Elasticity of EU service firm supply with respect to price of output
εAFR: Elasticity of AFR service firm supply with respect to price of output
εROW: Elasticity of Rest of World service firm supply with respect to price of output
Lower and upper values are 0.5
and 1.5 times central values.
σ(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
σ(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
σ(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties
σ(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
Parameter value % Change in Welfare (EV)
Central values of all 4 sets of  ε




Table 29: Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis for Preferential Liberalization between 
Tanzania and the EU in Professional Services
Parameter Lower Central Upper Lower Central Upper
σ(qi, qj) –  services sectors 1.5 3 4.5 0.26 0.04 0.03
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors See below 0.05 0.04 0.04
σ(va, bs) 0.625 1.25 1.875 0.03 0.04 0.05
σ(D, M) 2 4 6 0.04 0.04 0.04
σ(L, K) 0 . 5 1 1 . 50 . 0 40 . 0 40 . 0 4
σ(A1,…An) NA 0 0.25 NA 0.04 0.04
σ(D, E) 2 4 6 0.04 0.04 0.04
εTZA 0.04 0.04 0.04
εEU 0.03 0.04 0.05
εAFR 0.04 0.04 0.04
εROW 0.04 0.04 0.04
θr  NA 0 1 NA 0.04 0.03
θr  - CRTS model NA 0 1 NA 0.01 0.00
θm  0.025 0.05 0.075 0.04 0.04 0.04
σ(qi, qj) – goods sectors
Processed food 4.8 9.6 14.4
Beverages & tobacco products 1.5 2.3 3.1
Textile & leather products 2.8 3.6 4.4
Manufacture of basic & industrial chemicals 1.7 2.5 3.3
Manufacture of fertilizers & pesticides 1.6 2.4 3.2
Petroleum refineries 2.8 3.6 4.4
Glass & cement 2.3 4.6 6.9
Iron steel & metal products 3.7 7.3 11
Mining & quarrying 2.8 3.6 4.4
Grain milling 2.4 3.2 4
Key:
Source: Authors’ estimates.
Parameter value % Welfare Change (EV)
σ(qi, qj): Elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive sectors
σ(va, bs): Elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services
σ(D, M): Elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties
σ(L, K): Elasticity of substitution between primary factors of production in value added
Central values of all 4 sets of  ε
parameters are listed in table 6B.
Lower and upper values are 0.5
and 1.5 times central values.
εAFR: Elasticity of AFR service firm supply with respect to price of output
εROW: Elasticity of Rest of World service firm supply with respect to price of output
θr:  Share of rents in services sectors captured by domestic agents
θm: Shares of value added in multinational firms due to specialized primary factor imports 
σ(A1,…An): Elasticity of substitution in intermediate production between composite Armington aggregate goods
σ(D, E): Elasticity of transformation (domestic output versus exports)
εTZA: Elasticity of national service firm supply with respect to price of output




Appendix A: Trade Data and Tariff Rates for Tanzania’s Trade Partners 
 
Trade Data by Regional Partner and Sector 
 
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we used 
trade data for 2007 obtained from WITS access to the COMTRADE database.  
The regions of our model are Tanzania, the European Union, the East African Customs Union 
plus SADC and the Rest of the World. For the European Union, we took the 27 member 
countries as of 2007. In this appendix, we calculate and report data for the East African Customs 
Union and SADC separately. For the East African Customs Union, we took Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi. For SADC we took Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. Trade shares for the “Africa” region in our model are the sum of East 
Africa Customs Union plus SADC. Rest of the World is the residual.  
We mapped two digit sectors from the COMTRADE database into the sectors of our 
model. The exact mapping is defined in the first table below.  We used Tanzania as the reporter 
country for both exports and imports. Results for both exports and imports are reported in the 
subsequent two tables. 
Tariff Data. 
 
We were fortunate to receive unusually detailed collected tariff data from the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority.  That is, we received data on collected import duties (tariffs) and import 
values at the eight digit tariff line level. The collected tariff rates for the sectors in our model are 
obtained by first aggregating the eight digit tariff line level tariff collections and import values to 
the sectors of our model. The ratio of tariff collections to import values for each sector of our 
model is then calculated to give estimates of the collected tariff rates, which in turn are 
incorporated into our SAM. The tariff rates are shown in Table 4 of the main text. Applying 99 
 
these tariff rates across all sectors implies that tariff revenue in the revised database is about 
1.3% of GDP, which is consistent with collected revenues in Tanzania.
25  The SAM has some 
detail on taxes, which include direct taxes on households and enterprises, import tariffs, producer 
taxes, indirect (sales) taxes and factor taxes. The data for import tariffs are replaced with 
collected tariff rate data for the year 2006. 
Given that Tanzania participates in preferential trade areas with the East Africa Customs 
Union and the South African Development Community, it was necessary to make further 
adjustments. That is, since, in principle, tariff rates should be zero within these preferential trade 
areas, we set tariff collections on imports from SADC and EACU (our Africa region) at zero. We 
then increased the tariff rates for the other regions in our model so that the overall weighted 
average collected tariff rate is unchanged. We used the trade flow data, disaggregated by regions 
and sectors of our model to weight the tariff rates. This adjustment has the impact of raising the 
collected tariff rates for the regions in our model where positive tariff rates apply. The resulting 
adjusted tariff rates are reported in Table 4. 
                                                            
25 For the year 2006, aggregate data from Tanzania show that tariff collections are 1.47 percent of GDP.  100 
 
Notes on Product/Sector Classifications in SITC Revision 2
Product                    SITC Classiifcation (Rev. 2)
All goods 0 to 9
Dixit-Stiglitz Goods
Beverages and tobacco 1     
Food manufactures (excl. bev & tob) ** 012+014++0224+023+024++0252+037+046 to 048+056+058+0612+
0615+0619+062+0712+0722+0723+073+0812 to 0918+09+41+42+43
Printing and publishing 64    
Mineral fuels 3     
Chemicals  5     
Metals and machines 67+68+69+7
Non-metallic products 66    
Other manufactures (excl. CRTS sectors) 62+81+82+83+87+88+89
Agriculture (excl. food manuf & bev, tob) 0+1+2+4-27-28-1-above food manufacturing products
Other goods All goods-Dixit/Stiglitz goods-above agriculture
Agricultural Products
Maize  044   
Wheat  041   
Rice 042   
Barley 043   
Other cereals 045   
Cotton 263   
Sugar  061   
Coffee 071   
Tea  074   
Roots and tubers 0548  
Oil seeds and pulses 22    
Fruits 057+058
Vegetables 054+056
Cut flowers  2927  
Other crops 072+075+081
Beef 0111  
Dairy products 02    
Poultry 0114  
Meats of sheep and goats 0112  
Other livestock 00+0113+0115+0116+0118
Other CRTS Goods
Fishing 03    
Forestry 24+25
Mining 27+28
Meats and dairy 01+02
Grain milling 046+047
Sugar & bakery confectionary 062+073+048
Textiles and clothing  65+84
Leather and footwear 61+85
Wood and papers 63+64











Product  EAC EU27 SADC ROW WLD EAC EU27 SADC ROW WLD
All goods 258,044 421,282 368,109 1,091,912 2,139,347
Maize  4,270 0 1,193 6,491 11,954 0.36 0.00 0.10 0.54 1
Rice 2,500 0 68 1,406 3,973 0.63 0.00 0.02 0.35 1
Sorghum & millets/buckwheat 100 40 159 338 638 0.16 0.06 0.25 0.53 1
Wheat/meslin 19,832 3 161 10,959 30,956 0.64 0.00 0.01 0.35 1
Beans, Soya beans 0 129 1 34 164 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.21 1
Cassava/crude anim/veg matl nes 1,099 32,390 767 7,572 41,829 0.03 0.77 0.02 0.18 1
Other cereals (barley,rye, oats) 0 0 4 0 4 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1
Oil seeds excl soya beans 578 1,087 271 31,491 33,426 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.94 1
Veg root/tuber prep/pres 0 6 79 25 109 0.00 0.05 0.72 0.22 1
Cotton 1,076 5,137 1,498 51,661 59,372 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.87 1
Coffee 572 86,326 900 29,801 117,599 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.25 1
Tobacco, raw and wastes 434 72,477 1,485 20,425 94,822 0.00 0.76 0.02 0.22 1
Tea  22,635 10,200 2,603 4,528 39,966 0.57 0.26 0.07 0.11 1
Cashew nuts, fresh/dried 355 8,243 2,703 16,129 27,431 0.01 0.30 0.10 0.59 1
Sisal etc unspun/tow/waste 75 1,637 82 4,239 6,033 0.01 0.27 0.01 0.70 1
Sugar/mollasses/honey 173 21,438 2,041 123 23,776 0.01 0.90 0.09 0.01 1
Veg & fruits, excl nuts 1,744 3,925 217 55,018 60,904 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.90 1
Other crops (cocoa, spices, nuts, exc 202 12,312 17 12,683 25,215 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.50 1
Poultry & livestock 35 147 234 841 1,258 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.67 1
Fish/shellfish/etc. 11,037 107,050 1,604 45,889 165,580 0.07 0.65 0.01 0.28 1
Hunting & forestry 2,239 1,205 729 19,516 23,689 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.82 1
Mining & quarrying  25,702 451 4,009 220,122 250,284 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.88 1
Meats & dairy products 271 11 311 1,913 2,505 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.76 1
Grain milling products 12,346 78 29,440 1,493 43,357 0.28 0.00 0.68 0.03 1
Processed food 10,846 776 9,663 12,129 33,413 0.32 0.02 0.29 0.36 1
Beverages & tobacco products 2,906 429 4,735 591 8,661 0.34 0.05 0.55 0.07 1
Textiles & leather products  18,820 10,640 20,595 29,200 79,256 0.24 0.13 0.26 0.37 1
Wood & paper products  14,322 595 943 8,081 23,941 0.60 0.02 0.04 0.34 1
Chemicals, excl. fertilizer 6,481 814 19,939 6,726 33,960 0.19 0.02 0.59 0.20 1
Manufactured fertilizers 15,599 0 9,750 2 25,351 0.62 0.00 0.38 0.00 1
Petroleum and products 10,512 110 1,889 1,301 13,812 0.76 0.01 0.14 0.09 1
Rubber & plastic products 515 20 7,947 957 9,439 0.05 0.00 0.84 0.10 1
Glass & cement 3,344 17,199 31,558 26,702 78,802 0.04 0.22 0.40 0.34 1
Iron & metal products 5,982 5,387 7,872 10,123 29,365 0.20 0.18 0.27 0.34 1















Product  EAC EU27 SADC ROW WORLD EAC EU27 SADC ROW WORLD
All goods 110,087 1,046,227 684,108 4,078,599 5,919,022 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.69 1
Maize  198 1 1,536 577 2,313 0.09 0.00 0.66 0.25 1
Rice 75 667 7 4,257 5,006 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.85 1
Sorghum & millets/buckwheat 0 0 302 10 312 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.03 1
Wheat/meslin 0 1 0 233,495 233,496 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1
Beans, Soya beans 1 675 609 0 1,284 0.00 0.53 0.47 0.00 1
Cassava/crude anim/veg matl nes 242 2,084 852 837 4,014 0.06 0.52 0.21 0.21 1
Other cereals (barley,rye, oats) 0 1,442 0 24 1,466 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.02 1
Oil seeds excl soya beans 1,208 686 2,935 341 5,169 0.23 0.13 0.57 0.07 1
Veg root/tuber prep/pres 5 352 171 1,121 1,649 0.00 0.21 0.10 0.68 1
Cotton 0 2 0 183 185 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.99 1
Coffee 11 36 55 121 223 0.05 0.16 0.25 0.54 1
Tobacco, raw and wastes 0 2,057 2,934 2 4,993 0.00 0.41 0.59 0.00 1
Tea  0 13 3 4 21 0.01 0.63 0.16 0.19 1
Cashew nuts, fresh/dried 0 0 0 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.80 1
Sisal etc unspun/tow/waste 0 0 0 0 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Sugar/mollasses/honey 161 4,849 13,584 46,882 65,475 0.00 0.07 0.21 0.72 1
Veg & fruits, excl nuts 25 2,088 1,445 4,529 8,087 0.00 0.26 0.18 0.56 1
Other crops (cocoa, spices, nuts, exc 25 37 36 217 315 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.69 1
Poultry & livestock 421 521 324 19 1,285 0.33 0.41 0.25 0.01 1
Fish/shellfish/etc. 2 248 151 1,889 2,289 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.82 1
Hunting & forestry 14 112 744 1,409 2,279 0.01 0.05 0.33 0.62 1
Mining & quarrying  6,947 8,295 24,484 39,968 79,695 0.09 0.10 0.31 0.50 1
Meats & dairy products 443 1,105 2,287 1,637 5,472 0.08 0.20 0.42 0.30 1
Grain milling products 146 19,097 1,737 3,537 24,518 0.01 0.78 0.07 0.14 1
Processed food 4,620 21,149 2,570 275,296 303,635 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.91 1
Beverages & tobacco products 573 14,428 9,706 3,826 28,533 0.02 0.51 0.34 0.13 1
Textiles & leather products  1,546 2,647 5,437 90,898 100,528 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.90 1
Wood & paper products  2,034 18,142 23,795 32,411 76,382 0.03 0.24 0.31 0.42 1
Chemicals, excl. fertilizer 15,904 177,325 77,229 345,066 615,524 0.03 0.29 0.13 0.56 1
Manufactured fertilizers 492 21,948 9,573 34,800 66,812 0.01 0.33 0.14 0.52 1
Petroleum and products 23,838 8,188 141,512 1,584,422 1,757,960 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.90 1
Rubber & plastic products 933 15,070 11,490 66,676 94,169 0.01 0.16 0.12 0.71 1
Glass & cement 7,415 11,754 3,474 61,536 84,179 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.73 1
Iron & metal products 15,508 40,123 136,733 211,008 403,372 0.04 0.10 0.34 0.52 1






Appendix B: Documentation of the Calculation of Ownership Shares for Tanzania 
 
I. Telecommunications in Tanzania 
Company Market Shares 
The data source for market shares of the fixed line and mobile telephone companies in Tanzania was the 
website of the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. It provides yearly mobile and fixed-line 
phone subscription information.
26  Table 4 of their website lists the six phone service providers in 
Tanzania and the number of subscribers for the mobile and fixed-line markets.  The information allows us 
to calculate the market shares for each of the six companies. 
                                                            




For most of the firms, the ownership data were derived from Paul Buddle Communications, “Tanzania—
Telecoms Market Overview and Statistics,” dated April 5, 2008. For the five relevant companies we have 
the following ownership information.
27 
 
Zanzibar Telecommunications Corporaton (Zantel): Etisalat of the UAE acquired a 34% 
stake, with the government retaining 18%. The other shareholders are Kintbury Investment of the 
Channel Islands (24%) and MEECO International of Tanzania (24%). 
 
Vodacom Tanzania: Vodacom Tanzania is a subsidiary of South Africa-based Vodacom (Pty) 
Ltd, which owns 65% of the company. The remainder is held by Tanzanian companies Planetel 
Communications (16%) and Caspian Construction (19%).
28 
 
MIC Tanzania (also known as TIGO): Luxemburg-based Millicom International Cellular 
(MIC) owned 84% of the company until it assumed 100% ownership in early 2006 when it 
bought out other minority shareholders. 
 
Celtel Tanzania: Celtel Tanzania Ltd is 60% owned by Celtel International and 40% owned by 
the Tanzanian government. Celtel International is a subsidiary of the Zain Group of Kuwait.  
 
TTCL: Although it is in the process of privatization, it is 100 percent owned by the Government 
of Tanzania.  
 
Ownership Share Results  
 
The results for market share by country (in percent) are as follows: Tanzania, 31; EU, 22; EAC, 0; SADC, 





II. Banks in Tanzania 
Bank Market Shares 
The data source was Bankscope, an on-line data source for about 29,000 banks world-
wide.
29 Through Bankscope, we obtained data on total assets by bank in Tanzania, owners-
shareholders of the bank and the percent of the bank owned by each owner-shareholder. Market 
share of each bank was defined based on the bank’s assets as a share of total bank assets in the 
country.  We divided the regions into the European Union, East African Customs Union (EAC), 
                                                            
27 The market share of Benson Informatics, rounded to the nearest one-tenth of one percent is zero. Consequently we 
ignore Benson.  
28 Planetel Communications and Caspian Construction are local TZ companies. See the Mail & Guardian Online at:  
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-04-13-vodacoms-elite-network 
29 It combines data from the main information provider, Fitch Ratings, and nine other sources, with software for 
searching and analysis. Each bank report contains balance sheet and income statements with up to 200 data items.  104 
 
SADC (less the EAC) and Rest of the World.
30  In our model, we sum the shares of EAC and 
SADC (less EAC) to obain the shares of our Africa region. 
 
Ownership Shares of Banks 
Each bank’s market share was then allocated among geographic regions according to the 
shares of ownership of the bank. We then summed across the banks to obtain total market shares 
by region.  In many cases, however, the Bankscope data was inadequate to allocate ownership 
shares by region. In these cases, we investigated bank websites, to obtain the required ownership 
information. The results of our supplementary inquiries are listed below.  
The results we get are that owners of the banking sector of Tanzania are as follows (in 
percent): Tanzania, 77; EU, 6; EAC, 2; SADC, 1; ROW, 14 (see Table B2).    
 
Supplementary Information on Ownership Shares of Tanzanian Banks 
 
  Tanzania Postal Bank – 100% Tanzanian: 
“United Republic of Tanzania , 45.3%; Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 11.0%; Tanzania 
Posts Corporation, 33.2%; TP & TC SACCOS, 10.5%.” http://www.postalbank.co.tz/about.htm. 
 
  Azania Bank Limited – “The Current shareholders of the Bank are as follows: 
National Social Security Fund (NSSF), 40%; Parastatal Pension Fund (PPF),   35%; Public 
Service Pension Fund (PSPF), 14%; East African Development Bank, 7%; Tanzanian Individual 
including staff, 4%.” http://www.azaniabank.co.tz/azania/about.htm . 
 
  Consolidated Bank of Kenya Limited –- “The bank is fully owned by the Government of Kenya 
with the majority shareholding in the bank (51%) held by the Treasury through the Deposit 
Protection Fund. The remaining shareholding is spread over twenty five (25) parastatals and other 
government related/controlled organizations.” http://www.consolidated-
bank.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=57. 
 
  Faulu Kenya Limited – “Faulu Kenya Limited is incorporated in Kenya under the Companies Act 
and is a 70% owned subsidiary of Food for the Hungry International, which is registered in 
Switzerland.”  http://www.faulukenya.com/images/stories/pdf/Faulu_Annual_Report_2007.pdf . 
  Commercial Bank of Africa –“wholly Kenyan owned.”  
http://www.cba.co.ke/default2.php?active_page_id=117  . 
 
  Micro Provident Tanzania Limited – BW 85% – http://www.letshego.com/index.php?id=8   
Accessed 3 April 2009. 
 
  Tanzania Investment Bank – 99.3% TZ – “Subscribers to the share capital of the bank are 
the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (99.098%), Consolidated Holding 
Corporation (0.676%) and the National Insurance Corporation of Tanzania Limited 
(0.226%)” http://www.tib.co.tz/incorporation.html. 
                                                            
30 Although we calculated data for the U.S. and the U.K. separately, these were aggregated into the Rest of the 
World and the European Union, respectively.  105 
 
 
III. Tanzanian Insurance Companies 
 
The source of premium data for all Tanzanian insurance companies was the 
Commissioner of Insurance for Tanzania, Annual Marketing Report, 2007. These data are for the 
year 2007 and were provided by a consultant as they were not publicly available.  Based on these 
premium data, we calculated the market shares of each of the companies. We defined company 
market share as the share of total premium income in this market.  
 
The source of the ownership shares of each of the companies is the 2009 report on the 
non-life insurance market of Axco entitled ‘Insurance Market Information: Non-Life.” From this 
source we obtained the share of ownership for all companies by country.   
In Table B3, we list the result of these calculations.: Tanzania, 53.2; EU, 1.3; EAC, 39.6; 













Table B1: Tanzania Telecommunications Sector Ownership Shares, by Region 





MIC Tanzania (TIGO) Millicom International Cellular (MIC) (LU) 1.00 2,569,527 21.30% 21.30%
Tanzania Telecommunications Co 











Total Subscribers (Fixed‐line and Mobile) = 12,065,406 KE GB EU EAC COM US ROW
Market 
Share 34.04% 2.12% 21.30% 0.00% 29.14% 0.00% 22.21%
Scaled 














Table B2: Tanzania Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (1 of 2) 
TZ GB EU EAC SADC US ROW
1st Adili Bancorp Ltd
AccessBank Tanzania Limited African Development Bank (IL) 15.80









Azania Bank Limited Azania Bank Limited (TZ) 93.00 40070 0.48% 0.48%
Bank M (Tanzania) Limited
Bank of Baroda (Tanzania) Ltd Bank Of Baroda (IN) 100.00 34027 0.41% 0.41%
Bank of Tanzania State Of Tanzania (TZ) 100.00 3103713 37.15% 37.1 5%
Barclays Bank Tanzania Barclays Bank Plc (GB) 100.00 257673 3.08% 3.08%
Bayport Financial Services 2707 0.03%
BOA Bank (Tanzania) Ltd African Financial Holding Sa‐African Financ 34.08 54029 0.65% 0.65%
Capital Finance Ltd
CF Union Bank Ltd 23389 0.28%
Citibank Tanzania Limited Citibank Overseas Investment Corp (US) 100.00 386973 4.63% 4.63%

































Table B2: Tanzania Banking Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (2 of 2) 
TZ GB EU EAC SADC US ROW








Kenya Commercial Bank (Tanzania) Limited Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd (KE) 100.00 40379 0.48% 0.48%








NBC Ltd‐National Bank of Commerce Limited Absa Group Limited (ZA) 55.00 642372 7.69% 7.69%
People's Bank of Zanzibar Limited 57328 0.69%
Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises Limited
Savings & Finance Commercial Bank East African Development Bank (II) 33.00 28262 0.34% 0.34%
Stanbic Bank Tanzania Stanbic Africa Holdings Limited (GB) 100.00 254507 3.05% 3.05%
Standard Chartered Bank Tanzania Standard Chartered Holdings (Africa) B.V. (N100.00 441159 5.28% 5.28%
Tanzania Development Finance Company LimiAbc Holdings Limited (BW) 68.00






Twiga Bancorp Limited National Bank Of Commerce Limited‐Nbc L 100.00 22741 0.27% 0.27%
Grand Total = 8354842 TZ GB EU EAC SADC US ROW
Market 
Share 50.01 % 3.08% 0.76% 1.42% 0.46% 8.21% 1.04%
Scaled 


















Table B3: Tanzania Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (1 of 2) 




AAR Insurance Co. AAR  Holdings (KE) 100.00 0.9 0.76% 0.76%
Heritage Insurance Co. (T) Ltd. 22.6 19.20%









Mgen Tanzania Insurance Co. Ltd. Madison Insurance Group (ZM) 100.00 1.7 1.44% 1 .44%
Niko Insurance (Tanzania) Ltd. 6.2 5.27%
Nico Holdings Ltd (MW) 66.00 3.48%




British citizen (GB) 15.00 1 .29%
Prosperity Life Care Insurance (T) Ltd. Prosperity Life Care Insurance (ZA) 100.00 1.1 0.93% 0.93%
Reliance Insurance Co. (T) Ltd. 6.0 5.10%





















Table B3: Tanzania Insurance Sector Ownership Shares, by Region (2 of 2) 





Kenindia Assurance Company  Ltd (KE 65.00 3.1 5%
Tanzanian interests (TZ) 35.00 1.6 9 %
Zanzibar Insurance Corporation State‐owned (TZ) 100.00 4.4 3.74% 3.74%
National Insurance Corp. (NIC) State‐owned (TZ) 100.00 19.0 16.14% 16 .14 %
TZ GB EU EAC SADC US ROW
Market 
Share 53.2% 1 .3% 0.0% 39.6% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Grand Total (USD millions) = 117.7
Scaled 



















Appendix C : Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution for Goods 
 
It was necessary for us to obtain estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of 
substitution for the imperfectly competitive sectors in our model. Christian Broda, Joshua Greenfield and 
David Weinstein (2006) estimated Dixit-Stiglitz product variety elasticities of substitution at the 3 digit 
level in 73 countries. Among the 73 countries, there were four in sub-Saharan Africa: the Central 
African Republic, Madagascar, Malawi and Mauritius. We judged that Madagascar was the country 
closest in characteristics to Tanzania, so we took the values of the elasticities estimated for Madagascar 
as a proxy for the elasticities for Tanzania. 
Broda et al., estimate 3 digit elasticities for 130 goods sectors, but there are 34 goods sectors in 
our model,  It was necessary to map the sectors estimated by Broda et al. into the sectors of our model. 
In table C1 of this appendix, we show the mapping for the imperfectly competitive sectors. (These 
elasticities are not relevant in our model for perfectly competitive sectors.)  
Next, since there are often multiple sectors from Broda et al. mapped into a single sector in our 
model, it was necessary to determine a method of weighting the Broda et al. elasticities. There are 
reasons to use both export shares as well as import shares. A larger share of a subcategory in imports 
reflects more imports, and more likely there are more varieties of imports. So weighting by the import 
share of a subcategory is better than an unweighted measure.  Domestic varieties are also important.  
Since we do not have production data for the subcategories, we use export shares as a proxy for domestic 
production by subcategory. Analogously, weighting subcategories by export shares is better than 
unweighted categories. Since both import shares and export shares are useful in the weighting, we take 
one half the shares of both exports and imports as the weights. We obtained the data for the import and 
export shares from the COMTRADE database. The resulting elasticities are reported in table C1.   
For the sensitivity analysis, we must take upper and lower bounds of the elasticities. 
Unfortunately, Broda et al. only report point estimates in their on-line Excel file. In the paper itself, 
however, Broda et al. (2006, table 4, p. 36) list the standard error of the median Dixit-Stiglitz estimate 
for the country. The standard errors are rather small for most countries. In the case of Madagascar, the 
median Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity is 3.6 with a standard error (of the median estimate) of 0.27.  
Although we don’t have standard errors at the product line level, we use the overall estimate of 
the standard error to guide our choice of upper and lower values of the estimates. The low standard error 
suggests that we do not need to take very large ranges to check for robustness. For central values of 3.6 
or less, we took plus or minus three times the average standard error of 0.27. CGE modelers have often 
doubled and halved the central estimate in the sensitivity. For central values greater than 3.6, we took 
plus or minus 50% of the value of the parameter, which gives a wider band than plus or minus three 
times the standard error. For these elasticities, this presents a tougher test of the robustness of our model. 
Broda, Christian , Joshua Greenfield and David Weinstein (2006), “From Groundnuts to Globalization: 
A Structural Estimate of Trade and Growth,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working 




















Appendix D: Engineering Services in Tanzania - Restrictiveness Index
31 
 
Table 1 below is a table taken from Nguyen-Hong (2000) for Vietnam in which the components 
of the engineering restrictiveness index as well as the scoring options are presented.  The actual scores in 
table 1 are for Vietnam. The scores for Tanzania and the reasons for the scoring follow below the table. 
The Tanzania scores are based on the results of the World Bank Regulatory Survey in East Africa
32 and 
the World Bank Survey on Applied Policies in Services
33.  
Barriers to establishment 
 
Form of establishment Score 0.5 
 
All forms of legal entities (sole proprietorship, limited liability partnerships, general partnership, 
individual enterprise, limited liability companies and public limited companies) are permitted for both 
domestic and foreign firms.  
However, according to the Engineering Registration Act no. 63 Para 12: “1) No person or body of 
persons not citizen of the United Republic shall be registered as a local consultant or consulting firm 
unless–(a) in the case of natural person, he is a citizen of the United Republic; (b) in the case of a 
company, it is incorporated in Tanzania and the majority of its shares are owned by the citizens of the 
                                                            
31 The work on the estimation of the ad valorem equivalents of the barriers in engineering services was done by 
Josaphat Kweka with the guidance of Nora Dihel.   
32 The regulatory surveys were conducted by local consultants who interviewed the professional associations in the 
examined East African countries in 2009.  
33 The policy surveys were conducted by The World Bank Research Department in 2008-2009.  113 
 
United Republic. If these conditions are not met, the company shall be registered as a foreign consulting 











Foreign partnership/joint venture/association Score 0.5 
The information provided in the section on the form of establishment suggests that if a foreign firm is 
not in a partnership/joint venture, then it can be only a branch. Therefore, the score is 0.5. 
  
Investment and ownership by foreign professionals Score 0.5 
The majority of a company’s shares have to be owned by Tanzanians.  
 
Investment and ownership by non-professional investors Score 0.5 
The majority of a company’s shares have to be owned by Tanzanians.  116 
 
Nationality/citizenship requirements Score 0 
No restrictions. 
Residency and local presence Score 0 
No restrictions. 
Quotas/economic tests on the number of foreign professionals and firms Score 0 
No restrictions. 
Licensing and accreditation of domestic professionals Score 1 
Compulsory membership in professional association, professional examination, practical experience, and 
proof of higher education are required.  
Licensing and accreditation of foreign professionals Score 0.5 
Case by case assessment of foreign qualifications. According to the Contractors Registration Act Cap270 
“the Council may require an applicant for registration under this section to appear before it or produce 
documents relating to his work or employment”.  
 
Movement of people - permanent Score 0.25  
The Contractors Registration Act Cap 270: “the Council may, if it is satisfied that this professional and 
general conduct renders him a fit and proper person to be registered, direct that he be registered under 
this section for the duration of the specific assignment or for such period as the Council may specify”.  
Such as case by case assessment received a score of 0.5 (see the example of Vietnam in the 
Compendium). However, in Tanzania, professionals can be granted longer term /permanent permits if 
requested and dictated by market demand; therefore, the Country Office suggested to allocate a score of  




Activities reserved by law to the profession Score 1 
Domestic firms have exclusive rights / shared exclusive rights in 9 out of 10 categories. In addition, 
foreign firms can provide only 5 of the 10 categories (discriminatory rule).   
 
Multidisciplinary practices Score 0.6 
There are no restrictions on inter-professional cooperation (partnerships, associations, joint ventures) for 
both domestic and foreign suppliers. However, for consulting engineers there is a requirement for 
majority partnership. Also, foreign firms are not allowed to provide representation for obtaining permits 
- discriminatory practice. 117 
 
 
Advertising, marketing and solicitation- foreign Score 0.5 
Advertising and marketing by engineering professionals is not prohibited. Same provisions apply to 
domestic and foreign suppliers. However, foreign suppliers licensed to practice in Tanzania are not 
allowed to use their foreign supplier’s name in advertising and marketing activities.   
 
Advertising, marketing and solicitation - domestic Score 0 
Advertising and marketing by engineering professionals is not prohibited.  
 
Fee setting - domestic Score 1 
Fees and prices are regulated – there are binding minimum prices for all engineering services. According 
to ERB these measures regarding fees are applicable to domestic services providers only (they do not 
apply to foreign engineering service providers licensed to practice in Tanzania). 
 
Fee setting- foreign Score 0 
Fee regulations do not apply to foreign engineering service providers licensed to practice in Tanzania). 
Licensing requirements on management Score 0 
No restrictions. 
Movement of people – Temporary Score 0.5 
Case by case decision  
 
Other restrictions (Addition categories) Score 1  
Restrictions on use of firm's international name, restrictions on hiring professionals and government 





Dee, P. (2005), “A compendium of barriers to services trade”, prepared for the World Bank, 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/staff/phillippa_dee/Combined_report.pdf 118 
 
Nguyen-Hong, D. (2000), “Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services”, Productivity Commission 
Staff Research Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra. Available at: 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/staffresearch/rotips 
World Bank Regulatory Survey in East Africa conducted in the context of the Project “Trade in 
Professional Services in East Africa” in 2009.  
World Bank Survey on Applied Policies in Services conducted by DECRG in 2008-2009. 
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Appendix E: Data on Research and Development Expenditures and Sales for the United 
States in 2004 and 2005. 
 
TABLE E1.  Funds for industrial R&D and sales for companies performing industrial R&D in the United States, by industry: 2004 and 2005
Sales in $millions Ratio of R&D expenses
Industry and company size NAICS codes 2004 2005 2004-2005 average in 2005 to sales (x1,000)
All industries 21–23, 31–33, 42, 44–81 208,301     226,159 217,230 6,119,133 36
    Manufacturing industries 31–33 147,288     158,190 152,739 3,998,256 38
        Food 311 2,254     2,716 2,485 374,342 7
        Beverage and tobacco products 312 555 i 539 547 38,003 14
        Textiles, apparel, and leather 313–16 570     816 693 51,639 13
        Wood products 321 D D 0 27,002 0
        Paper, printing, and support activities 322, 323 D D 0 159,608 0
        Petroleum and coal products 324 1,603 D 802 404,317 2
        Chemicals 325 D 42,995 21,498 624,344 34
            Pharmaceuticals and medicines 3254 31,477 34,839 33,158 273,377 121
        Plastics and rubber products 326 D 1,760 880 90,176 10
        Nonmetallic mineral products 327 787 894 841 50,344 17
        Primary metals 331 727 631 679 110,960 6
        Fabricated metal products 332 1,512 1,375 1,444 174,165 8
        Machinery 333 6,579 8,531 7,555 230,941 33
        Computer and electronic products 334 48,296 D 24,148 472,330 51
        Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 335 2,664 2,424 2,544 101,398 25
        Transportation equipment 336 D D 0 957,051 See note
            Motor vehicles, trailers, and parts 3361–63 15,677 D 7,839 646,486 12
            Aerospace products and parts 3364 13,086 15,005 14,046 227,271 62
            Other transportation equipment other 336 D D 0 83,294 0
        Furniture and related products 337 408     400 404 48,534 8
        Miscellaneous manufacturing 339 4,388     5,143 4,766 83,103 57
            Medical equipment and supplies 3391 3,343     4,374 3,859 56,661 68
            Other miscellaneous manufacturing other 339 1,045     769 907 26,442 34
Industry and company size NAICS codes 2004 2005 2004-2005 average
    Nonmanufacturing industries 21–23, 42, 44–81 61,013     67,969 64,491 2,120,877 30
        Mining, extraction, and support activities 21 D D 0 33,665 0
        Utilities 22 202 210 206 223,395 1
        Construction 23 1,481 D 741 57,187 13
        Wholesale trade 42 D D 0 107,485 0
        Retail trade 44, 45 1,596 D 798 232,150 3
        Transportation and warehousing* 48, 49 D D 0 79,436 See Note
        Information 51 22,593 23,836 23,215 445,489 52
        Finance, insurance, and real estate 52, 53 1,708     3,030 2,369 580,380 4
        Professional, scientific, and technical services 54 28,709     32,021 30,365 261,500 116
            Architectural, engineering, and related services 5413 4,265     4,687 4,476 50,121 89
            Computer systems design and related services 5415 11,575     13,592 12,584 136,376 92
            Scientific R&D services 5417 11,355     12,299 11,827 34,516 343
            Other professional, scientific, and technical servicesother 54 1,514     1,444 1,479 40,487 37
        Health care services 621–23 500     989 745 25,076 30
        Other nonmanufacturingb 55, 56, 61, 624,  1,595     2,137 1,866 75,115 25





*We evaluate transportation as a medium R&D sector since three sectrors dominate R&D expenditures of US multinationals operating abroad. These are transportation, chemiicals and computers and 
electronics. Moreover, about two-thirds of all R&D expenditures of foreign multinationals operatingi in the US was performed in the same three sectors. See "U.S. and International Research and 
Development: Funds and Technology Linkages," at  'http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/c4/c4s5.htm.
SOURCE:  Calculated from data in National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, Survey of Industrial Research and Development:  2005, Data Tables . Available at:  
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf10319/content.cfm?pub_id=3750&id=3.    